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Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review
of Campaign Reform
Spencer Overton*
The constitutional doctrine governing campaign finance law allows judicial
outcomes to turn on often unstated political assumptions. As illustrated by the
conflicting opinions of different United States Supreme Court Justices in
McConnell v. FEC, current narrow tailoring and substantial overbreadth
doctrines provide inadequate guidance for balancing the need for regulation
against the right of free speech. This Article identifies four democratic values
that judges should balance in deciding whether campaign finance laws restrict
too much protected speech: democratic deliberation, widespread participation,
individual autonomy, and electoral competition. Courts should make these
values the explicit bases for reviewing campaign finance laws in the future.
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I. Introduction
Two opposing approaches have emerged in judicial review of campaign
finance reforms. The majority and dissenting opinions in the recent United
States Supreme Court case of McConnell v. FEC1 illustrate the competing
perspectives. Judges supportive of reform often tolerate regulations said to
prevent corruption, even at the expense of infringing on some speech that
1.

McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
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poses little threat of corruption. Judges skeptical of reform err on the side of
protecting speech, even if doing so may increase the risk of government
corruption. Much more is at issue in this conflict than rhetoric about judicial
restraint or judicial responsibility to protect speech. Campaign spending and
regulations shape the outcomes of elections and legislative struggles over such
critical issues as quality health care, clean air, and tax cuts. Ultimately, the
stakes include the meaning of democracy itself.
The need to resolve this clash is now more urgent than ever. In the
aftermath of the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and
the Court’s decision in McConnell to uphold most of the Act’s provisions,2
reformers have continued their crusade to close loopholes by working to
broaden other federal and state regulations.3 This expansion will involve
2. See infra Part II.B (discussing in detail the various provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
3. In the aftermath of the ban on unlimited soft money contributions to political parties,
a few individuals contributed millions to groups organized under Section 527 of the Internal
Revenue Code. These groups plan to spend such money to support or attack particular
candidates, and some reformers have worked to restrict contributions to such groups. See
Examining the Scope and Operation of Organizations Registered under Section 527 of the
Internal Revenue Code: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Rules, 108th Cong. (2004)
(testimony of John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona) (asserting that Section 527
organizations are intended to influence federal elections and therefore should be regulated like
political committees that are limited to accepting contributions from individuals of $5000 or
less); Dan Balz and Thomas B. Edsall, Democrats Forming Parallel Campaign; Interest Groups
Draw GOP Fire, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2004, at A01 (describing formation of 527 groups in the
aftermath of the ban on soft money). But see Richard Hasen, A GOP Flip-Flop on Political
Ads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at M7 (asserting that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s current
doctrine holding that limits on independent expenditures by individuals are unconstitutional
because such expenditures pose little threat of corruption, "it is hard to see how contributions to
[527] groups could constitutionally be regulated," at least with regard to 527s that make
independent expenditures in support of candidates and do not make contributions to candidates
or parties or make coordinated expenditures in support of such entities). Over the past ten
years, evasion has surfaced as a primary challenge to campaign reform. See MICHAEL J.
MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LESSONS
FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 79–96 (1998) (describing various tactics that interest groups use to
circumvent campaign finance regulations); Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft
Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 598, 598 (2000) ("American
campaign finance law is often described as more loophole than law."); Richard Briffault, The
Political Parities and Campaign Finance Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 652 (2000)
("Campaign finance reform cannot survive unless the loopholes developed or exploited by the
parties are plugged."); Richard L. Hasen, Shrink Missouri, Campaign Finance, and "The Thing
that Wouldn’t Leave," 17 CONST. COMMENTARY 483, 508 (2000) ("The pressures from voters
and reformers who will continue to challenge Buckley on the one hand, and the loophole-driven
campaign finance reality that undermines the Court’s Buckley structure on the other, suggest
that something must give."); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of
Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) ("First, we think political
money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air. Second, we

666

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (2004)

regulation of additional expressive activities. Civil liberties groups will
respond immediately with litigation.
As yet, however, judges lack adequate guidance as to the point at which
reforms go too far in infringing on speech. Narrow tailoring and substantial
overbreadth tests forbid reforms that regulate an unacceptable amount of
protected speech—speech that does not pose a threat of corruption or a similar
danger. Yet even in the aftermath of the majority opinion in McConnell the
tests do not specify precisely how much of such speech a campaign finance
law must regulate before a judge should invalidate the law. Academic
commentators have also largely ignored this question, choosing instead to
focus on the general benefits of either greater or lesser regulation.4 This
Article examines the challenges that judges confront in reviewing reforms and
develops a framework that will facilitate more principled judicial review of
reforms.
Inadequate doctrinal guidance compels even the best judges to rely on
their own assumptions about politics when reviewing reforms. The judges
may cloak their decisions in First Amendment clichés like "the marketplace of
think political money, like water, is part of a broader ecosystem. Understanding why it flows
where it does and what functions it serves when it gets there requires thinking about the system
as a whole."); Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 531 (2000) ("The hydraulics of campaign finance make it so that
people will find creative loopholes around the limits, as long as politicians want to take that
money and people receive a benefit from giving it or spending it."). The Supreme Court has
tolerated some regulations designed not to prevent corruption directly, but to prevent the
circumvention of other regulations that directly prevent corruption. See FEC v. Beaumont, 123
S. Ct. 2200, 2209–10 (2003) ("Nonprofit advocacy corporations are . . . no less susceptible than
traditional business companies to misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits
imposed on individuals."); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456
(2001) (asserting that "all Members of the Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of
corruption").
4. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political,
and Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761, 1763 (1999) (advocating less regulation); D.
Bruce La Pierre, Campaign Contribution Limits: Pandering to Public Fears about "Big
Money" and Protecting Incumbents, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 687, 741 (2002) (same); Bradley A.
Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L. J. 45,
95–96 (1997) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663, 664 (1997) (same); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A
Constitutional Principal of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1215 (1994)
(advocating greater regulation); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27–28
(1996) (same); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First
Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1999) (same); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 279 (1993) (same); Cass R.
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392–93
(1994) (same).
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ideas"5 or vague phrases like "preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption."6 They fail, however, to detail doctrinal specifics that limit these
concepts. Instead, assumptions about the appropriate role of money in politics
animate the decisions. Unfortunately, judges often leave these assumptions
unstated because conventional First Amendment doctrine provides insufficient
avenues for judges to discuss and analyze democratic values.
Because judges’ individual assumptions about politics differ, courts often
reach inconsistent decisions.7 These holdings sometimes neglect relevant
issues such as fair deliberation about public affairs and widespread
participation by citizens. Other holdings fail to respect the importance of
individual autonomy or the need to ensure that incumbent officeholders do not
design reforms to disadvantage challengers. Too many of the decisions go too
far in infringing on either speech or legislative authority to regulate
campaigns. The incoherent doctrine that emerges from these cases carries
significant costs. Legislatures, unclear about the shape of constitutionally
permissible regulation, often lack the will to enact what citizens perceive as
much-needed reforms. As a result, legislation is likely to be either ineffective
or deemed unconstitutional. The lack of constitutional direction also hampers
compliance with, and enforcement of, such laws by those generally skeptical
of campaign reform.
This Article uses the controversy in McConnell8 to illustrate the challenge
that courts face when attempting to distinguish between effective reforms that
properly close loopholes and those that go too far. Under prior law, statutes
prohibited corporations and unions from spending money on political
advertisements containing express words of advocacy, such as "vote for" or
"defeat" a particular candidate. Corporations and unions, however,
circumvented these laws by spending money on advertisements that omitted
words like "vote for" and "defeat," but attacked or praised a particular
candidate. In response, Congress passed the electioneering provisions of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the Act or BCRA).9 The Act
restricted corporate and union spending on targeted advertisements that refer

5. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 412 (1984).
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
7. See infra Part III (discussing and providing examples of the incoherence that emerged
from political assumptions among the Supreme Court Justices in McConnell v. FEC and in
earlier campaign finance cases).
8. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
9. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Act).
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to a federal candidate and are broadcast in the few weeks prior to an election,
regardless of whether such advertisements use express words of advocacy.10
In McConnell, a majority of the United States Supreme Court upheld the
electioneering provisions, with four Justices dissenting.11 Although it was
framed in doctrinal language, the Justices’ dispute in McConnell centered on
disagreements about the role of money in politics. The dissenters’ focus on
unfettered political spending, for example, led them to conclude that the Act
covered too many advertisements that did not pose a threat of corruption. The
five Justices in the majority, concerned about political spending unduly
influencing elected officials, concluded that the number of advertisements that
posed no threat of corruption was small relative to the number of corrupting
activities that would occur in the absence of the statute. The lack of doctrinal
guidance allowed the Justices’ personal assumptions about politics to drive
their decisionmaking.
This Article proposes that the Court expressly articulate the values that its
doctrine seeks to serve, rather than suppress the assumptions about democracy
that underlie its own opinions. The cases suggest that the Justices aim to
promote four democratic values: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. Judges should
uphold reforms that, on balance, advance these values. The doctrinal origins
and the definitions of these values, as well as how a judge would apply the
test, are detailed below. The important initial point, however, is that campaign
reforms necessarily implicate democratic values. A better judicial test should
provide an avenue for judges to consider these values explicitly when
reviewing reforms.
Although less than perfect, the new test is a better compromise of
sensitivity to context, substantive democratic values, and judicial guidance
than the alternatives. Substantial overbreadth and narrow tailoring doctrines
inadequately define the "prevention of corruption" rationale that justifies
regulation, and they fail to articulate the democratic objectives attained by
unregulated use of money in campaigns. Further, these conventional tests do
not clearly describe the proportion of illegitimate applications of a statute that
is sufficiently "substantial" to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. In
contrast, this Article extensively details each of the four democratic values that
campaign spending and regulations should advance. The requirement that
10. Other significant provisions of the Act banned soft money contributions and increased
hard money limits. See infra Part II.B (explaining in detail the statute challenged in the case
and citing specific provisions).
11. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659–84 (upholding various electioneering provisions).
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judges invalidate regulations that do more harm than good to these four values
provides more normative guidance than the "substantial" overbreadth doctrine.
In short, the values give legislatures clearer guidance for crafting reforms and
they provide judges more direction in protecting speech and respecting
legislative authority.
A balancing test is also preferable to mechanical, bright-line judicial rules
that categorize the activities a legislature may regulate and invalidate attempts
to regulate all other activities. Although these rigid rules provide guidance,
they would become obsolete quickly. Politics constantly evolves, and fixed
boundaries would prevent legislatures from responding to corrupting activities
outside of the predetermined categories. If the Court attempts to avoid this
problem by drawing a broader category that allows regulation of more
activities, legislatures might infringe on an unacceptable amount of speech that
poses no threat of corruption.
While political assumptions may influence judicial balancing of these
values, the concrete listing of the most important values provides at least a
common starting point from which judges can analyze cases. Absent
explicitly articulated common values, judges rely on personal assumptions
about politics that often remain unstated and avoid challenge or debate. An
honest exchange about how courts should balance the values in particular
contexts, rather than glossing over tough issues with abstract rhetoric and
mechanical categories, will allow for a more coherent doctrine.12
Part II of this Article illustrates the problem of campaign law
circumvention and details a legislative response to the problem through the
enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. This Part also
reviews judicial tests that require statutes to be narrowly tailored and prohibit
ones that are substantially overbroad. Part III reviews the Court’s opinion in
McConnell v. FEC. This Part also argues that overbreadth tests allow for
judicial decisions that are shaped largely by unstated normative and empirical
assumptions about politics and examines the costs of these tests. Part IV
explores the shortcomings of bright-line rules in resolving this problem. Part
V identifies four important democratic values in the campaign finance context
and applies a new test that balances these values.
II. A Loophole, a Legislative Response, and First Amendment Doctrine
12. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35 (1986) (observing that balancing tests make a judge
"confront the parties in the flesh" and deny the judge "the refuge of objective determinacy
lodged in some force other than herself").
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As mentioned above, litigation surrounding the Act’s provisions
illustrates the challenge courts face in distinguishing between effective reforms
that properly close loopholes and those that go too far in regulating speech that
poses no threat to state interests. This Part details the issue-advocacy
loophole, the legislative response of the Act, and the First Amendment
doctrine that opponents of the legislation asserted courts should employ to
invalidate the provisions.
A. The Issue-Advocacy Loophole
Prior to 1976, the broad statutory language of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) purported to regulate spending "relative to" a federal
candidate13 and spending "for the purpose of influencing" the election of a
federal candidate.14 In Buckley v. Valeo,15 the Supreme Court stated that
FECA’s imprecise language raised constitutional concerns about vagueness
and overbreadth. The Court limited the scope of the statute to cover spending
only on communications that contained express words of advocacy for election
or defeat, such as "‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith
for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’"16 Thereafter, FECA
required disclosure of spending on express words of advocacy and prohibited
corporations and unions from spending money on such speech.17
In 1996, a large number of individuals, parties, corporations, and unions
began funding political advertisements designed to influence elections,
including attack advertisements that cast specific candidates in a negative
light. The advertisements stopped short of using magic words such as "vote

13. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1976) ("The key operative language of the
provision [Section 608(e)(1)] limits ‘any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified
candidate.’").
14. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1974) (repealed 1976) (requiring disclosure and reporting of
the use of money or other valuable assets "for the purpose of . . . influencing the nomination or
election of candidates for federal office").
15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
16. Id. at 44 n.52.
17. See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(2)(A) (2000) ("Each report
under this section shall disclose . . . contributions from persons other than political
committees."); id. § 441b(a) (stating that corporations and unions are prohibited from using
funds from their general treasuries on independent expenditures); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (construing the prohibition in 2 U.S.C. § 441b of corporate
spending "in connection with" any federal election to be limited to corporate spending on
express advocacy).
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for" or "vote against." As a result, they were not subject to FECA’s disclosure
requirements or prohibitions on spending by corporations and unions.
Consider an example. In 2000, Texas billionaires Charles and Sam Wyly
aired the following advertisement in Ohio just days before that state’s
Republican presidential primary:
Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy. That
means more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. Ohio
Republicans care about clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one of
the first states in America to clamp down on old coal-burning electric
power plants. Bush’s clean air laws will reduce air pollution more than a
quarter million tons a year. That’s like taking 5 million cars off the road.
Governor Bush, leading, for each day dawns brighter.18

Because the Wylys avoided the use of express words of advocacy such as
"vote for Bush," they were not required to disclose the expenditure to the
FEC.19 For the same reason, federal law would not have prevented Microsoft
Corporation or the AFL-CIO from spending unlimited amounts to broadcast
the pro-Bush advertisement.
Such easy circumvention of FECA resulted in a steady growth of
spending on "issue advocacy" designed to influence federal elections. The
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania estimated
that parties, groups, unions, corporations, and individuals spent up to $150
million on issue advocacy in the 1995–96 election cycle,20 $341 million in the
1997–98 cycle,21 and $509 million in the 1999–2000 cycle.22 By comparison,
18. CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT NYU
SCHOOL OF LAW, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS
25 (2002), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/downloads/buyingtime2000
/chapter3.pdf.
19. Indeed, the advertisement included a tag line reading "paid for by Republicans for
Clean Air," misleading many to believe that an established environmental group sponsored the
advertisement. Id.
20. See DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVOCACY
ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (1997) (observing that during the 1995–96 election
cycle, political parties, labor unions, trade and business associations, and ideological interest
groups spent between $135 and $150 million—more than a third as much as did the candidates
themselves—on issue-advocacy advertising), available at http://www.appcpenn.org/03_political
_communication/issueads/REP16.PDF.
21. See JEFFREY D. STANGER & DOUGLAS G. RIVLIN, ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE
ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1997–1998 ELECTION CYCLE 1 (1998) (estimating
spending on issue ads during the 1997–98 election cycle to be between $275 and $341 million).
22. See ANNENBERG PUB. POLICY CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN THE 1999–2000 ELECTION
CYCLE 6 (2001) ("In the 2000 cycle we estimate that more than $509 million was spent on issue
advocacy television and radio advertising."), available at http://www.appcpenn.org/
03_political_communication/issueads/2001_1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf.
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FECA required disclosure of only $36.7 million in independent expenditures
on express advocacy in support of candidates during the 1999–2000 election
cycle.23
B. A Legislative Response: The Electioneering Provisions
In response to the growth of issue advocacy, Congress passed the
electioneering provisions of the Act.24 The Act expanded FECA’s regulatory
scope beyond spending on express advocacy consisting of words such as "vote
against" to include expenditures on electioneering communications that
mention a candidate in the weeks before an election. Specifically, the statute
defines "electioneering communications" to consist of (1) any television, radio,
cable, or satellite broadcast, (2) that refers to a clearly identified candidate for
federal office, (3) run within 60 days before a general election or 30 days
before a primary election, and (4) that can be received by at least 50,000
people in the district that the federal candidate seeks to represent.25 To address
23. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, TOTAL INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES FOR/AGAINST
FEDERAL CANDIDATES, 1999–2000, at fig. 6 (Oct. 17, 2002) (indicating that entities reported to
the FEC $36,693,258 in federal independent expenditures during the 1999–2000 election cycle)
(on file with author). Note that other entities, primarily political parties, made $50,182,796 in
coordinated expenditures during the cycle and that corporations and unions expended
$17,838,437 in communication costs. Id. at figs. 2, 3, 6. Communication costs are funds used
by unions and corporations, directly from their general treasuries, to communicate political
messages expressly advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates or parties to a
restricted class, defined as the union’s members and their families or the corporation’s
executives, management personnel, stockholders, and their families. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)
(2000) (excluding communication costs from the definition of contribution or expenditure).
24. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). McConnell v. FEC is the consolidation
of eleven suits challenging various provisions of the Act. See McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02CV-582 (D.D.C. May 13, 2002) (ordering consolidation). In addition to the electioneering
provisions, the Act banned "soft money" contributions, increased hard money contribution
limits, and contained other reforms. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, §§ 101, 304, 307, 116 Stat. 81, 82, 99–100, 102–03 (2002).
25. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
88–90 (2002). In the event the Court declared this definition unconstitutional, the Act provided
that an electioneering communication shall mean any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication:
which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a
candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no
plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific
candidate.
Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 89.
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the evasion of FECA’s provisions that require disclosure of spending on
express advocacy, the Act requires disclosure of expenditures on
electioneering communications by any spender that exceed an aggregate of
$10,000 per year.26 The Act also prohibits corporations and unions from
spending money from their general treasuries on electioneering
communications.27 This prohibition extends to nonprofit corporations, such as
the National Rifle Association (NRA) and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), which receive money from business corporations or unions.28
Political action committees affiliated with corporations and unions, however,
can continue to spend money on electioneering communications.29
26. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88.
27. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 91. The Act also attempted to clarify the contested question of
candidates’ collaboration with funders to create issue advertisements by treating electioneering
spending that was coordinated with a candidate or party as a contribution subject to the source
and amount limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Id. § 202, 116
Stat. at 90–91.
28. Not unlike FECA’s restrictions on corporate spending on express advocacy, the
electioneering provisions limit most nonprofit corporations’ spending. Although the
electioneering provisions’ prohibitions on spending do not apply to nonprofit corporations that
operate under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(6) (2003)), other
legal directives prohibit § 501(c)(3) organizations from intervening in political campaigns or
expressing an opinion about a politician’s position on a given issue during a political campaign.
See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972)
(stating that efforts to defeat certain political candidates through public criticism violated
§ 501(c)(3)), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(3)(iii) (as
amended in 1990) (same). The electioneering provisions’ spending prohibitions are also
inapplicable to § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that (1) have as their express purpose the promotion of
political ideas only; (2) do not engage in business activities; (3) have no shareholders or other
persons who receive any benefit that would be a disincentive for them to disassociate
themselves from the corporation if they were to disagree with the corporation’s position;
(4) were not established by a business corporation or labor organization; and (5) do not accept
donations or anything of value from business corporations or labor organizations. See 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.16 (2003) (codifying exemption from spending prohibitions created by the Court in
Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64
(1986)). Note that even § 501(c)(4) nonprofits that meet all of these requirements may lose
their tax-exempt status if they engage in too much campaign activity. Although the IRS has
allowed § 501(c)(4) nonprofits to engage in some campaign advocacy, the extent of that activity
is unclear. See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (stating that "the regulations do not impose a
complete ban" on campaign activities); see also Laura B. Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A
Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 328–29 (1990) (suggesting that
election-related activity may comprise up to somewhat less than half of the corporation’s total
activity).
29. FECA allows corporations and unions to establish political action committees (PACs),
but requires that financial contributions to such PACs come from natural persons, such as union
members or corporate managers, rather than from the corporation or union’s general treasury.
See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2003) (prohibiting corporations, national
banks, and labor organizations from contributing to federal elections, and prohibiting political
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Soon after Congress passed the Act, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)
and others filed suit. They claimed, among other things, that the
electioneering provisions restrict an unacceptable amount of core political
speech that poses no threat of corruption or similar danger. Specifically, they
claimed that the provisions are not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
state interest and that they are substantially overbroad.30 According to
plaintiffs, Buckley v. Valeo established a firm constitutional line that prevents
Congress from regulating spending on any speech that does not contain
express advocacy.31 A majority of a special three-judge court voted to
invalidate the electioneering provisions as overbroad,32 and the parties
appealed the matter to the United States Supreme Court.33
C. Overbreadth Doctrine

committees from accepting contributions from these sources). PACs are also regulated by 2
U.S.C. §§ 432, 433, 434, and 441a (2003). Due to the ability of corporations and unions to pay
for electioneering from PAC funds, the defendants characterize the limitations on corporate and
union spending not as restrictions or prohibitions on spending, but rather as "source" rules. See,
e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendants Senator John McCain et al., at 43, McConnell v. FEC, 124
S. Ct. 619 (2003) (No. 02-1674) [hereinafter, Brief for McConnell Intervenor-Defendants]
("[N]othing in Title II ‘bans’ any speech . . . . Corporations and unions remain entirely free to
run an ad at any time . . . so long as they use funds raised by their PACs."), available at
http://sitepilot.firmseek.com/client/clc/www/attachment.html/defbrief.congsponsors.redacted.
pdf?id=894.
30. See Brief for Appellants/Cross-Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell, et al. at 49–57,
McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (No. 02-1674) [hereinafter, Brief for McConnell
Plaintiffs] (contending that the electioneering provisions would cover communications devoted
to policy without an intent to influence a federal election, such as "advertisements that urge
support of or opposition to pending legislation where the communication merely urges the
viewer to contact an official."), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachment.
html/02-1674+brief.pdf?id=848.
31. See id. at 40 (contending that in order to "eliminate constitutional overbreadth," the
Court in Buckley "drew the constitutional line at express advocacy").
32. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 798–99 (D.D.C. 2003) (Leon, J.)
(concluding that the electioneering provisions were "substantially overbroad"); id. at 364–66
(Henderson, J.) (concluding that prior cases set forth a firm constitutional rule that any
regulation of spending on political speech was substantially overbroad unless all of the speech
regulated included ‘express advocacy’). Judge Kollar-Kotelly was the sole judge on the court
below to uphold the electioneering provisions. Id. at 628 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The three-judge
court, however, upheld a backup definition of the electioneering provisions that was more vague
than the primary definition.
33. A special provision of the BCRA allowed for a direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court.
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Courts use two First Amendment tests to determine whether to invalidate
statutes that regulate too many instances of speech that do not pose the danger
that prompted the regulation. One test focuses on whether statutes are
narrowly tailored. The other looks for statutes that are substantially overbroad
on their face.
"Suspect-content" tests require that lawmakers narrowly tailor statutes to
advance a compelling governmental interest.34 The Court has identified the
prevention of both corruption and the appearance of corruption as compelling
governmental objectives for campaign finance regulations.35 To be narrowly
tailored, the statute must further the government’s objectives, must not be
overinclusive or underinclusive to an unacceptable extent, and must not be
unnecessarily burdensome.36 "Where at all possible, government must curtail
speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at hand,
and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has
prompted regulation."37 Generally, heightened scrutiny functions as a rule-like
category because it presumes that regulation is impermissible.38 In the
campaign finance context, however, some regulations, such as limits on
contributions,39 coordinated expenditures, and independent expenditures by
corporations, survive more stringent scrutiny.
34. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990)
("Because the right to engage in political expression is fundamental to our constitutional
system, statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.").
35. The Court has acknowledged additional state interests that justify disclosure
requirements: providing the electorate with the data necessary to make informed political
decisions, exposing large contributions to public scrutiny, and enforcing campaign finance laws.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976). Unless otherwise stated, this Article uses the term
"prevention of corruption" as shorthand to refer to state interests generally and uses terms such
as "corruption" and "corrupt" to refer to the various dangers posed by political activities that
justify regulation.
36. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422–23 (1996).
37. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986); see United States v.
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993) ("The validity of [a] regulation depends on the
relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to
which it furthers the government’s interest in an individual case.").
38. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 865
(1991) ("The ‘compelling state interest’ test that is applied to content-based regulations of fully
protected speech is a balancing test of a kind, but is generally not so labeled, due to the heavy
presumption that regulation is impermissible.").
39. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385–87 (2000) (reviewing
contribution limits using a standard of scrutiny more stringent than intermediate scrutiny but
"different" from the strict scrutiny applied to expenditure limits).
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A second judicial test allows for facial invalidation of "substantially
overbroad" statutes. Substantial overbreadth occurs when the proportion of
invalid applications of the statute is substantially high relative to valid
applications.40 The doctrine works to prevent overly broad statutes from
"chilling" constitutionally protected speech.41 Facial invalidation based on
overbreadth has been described as "strong medicine" that "has been employed
by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort."42 Some have described First
Amendment vagueness as a subset of the substantial overbreadth doctrine.43
Statutory language that requires disclosure of spending "for the purpose of
influencing" federal elections is particularly susceptible to a large number of
invalid applications and therefore presents vagueness concerns.44
Scholars have described First Amendment applications of the narrow
tailoring and substantial overbreadth tests as substantively identical.45 Narrow
tailoring is a judicial tool used to implement substantive constitutional
principles, whereas substantial overbreadth has been described as an
"ancillary" tool with origins in First Amendment, due process, and federal
40. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (rejecting a substantial
overbreadth claim because the statute’s "legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible
applications"); Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[W]e believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.").
41. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (finding that laws burdening expression must be
invalidated if the "statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression"); see also Fallon, supra note 38, at 857 ("One
theory characterizes the doctrine as procedural or prophylactic, aimed at eliminating the ‘chill’
that overbroad statutes cast on constitutionally protected speech.").
42. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
43. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 904 ("First Amendment vagueness doctrine—as distinct
from ordinary or non-First Amendment vagueness doctrine—is best conceptualized as a subpart
of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine . . . ."); id. at 905 ("[W]e have reason to be
sufficiently worried about vagueness to want a special First Amendment vagueness doctrine
only insofar as vagueness threatens constitutionally protected speech—that is, only insofar as
vague statutes are, or are too likely to be experienced as, overbroad.").
44. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) (1974) (repealed 1976) (requiring disclosure and reporting of
the use of money or other valuable assets "for the purpose of . . . influencing" the nomination or
election of candidates for federal office).
45. See Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1782 n.46 (2001) ("Other legal doctrines, such as the requirement of
‘narrow tailoring’ under strict scrutiny, serve a function similar to overbreadth."); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 37 n.152 ("The issue generally is framed in
terms of the availability of less restrictive alternatives . . . . In the First Amendment area we
speak of overbreadth, but fashions in the use of language cannot disguise the substantive
identity of the two inquiries . . . .").
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courts doctrines.46 Further, the narrow tailoring test can invalidate not only
overinclusive statutes but also those that are underinclusive.47 Both doctrines,
however, balance state and private interests in expression and association. An
overbreadth claim is necessarily a facial challenge to a statute; a narrow
tailoring analysis can involve not only an as-applied challenge but also a facial
one.48
Most important for this Article, both doctrines present normative and
empirical challenges in determining how many invalid applications of the
statute constitute a "substantial" amount that warrants facial invalidation.49
Therefore, the remainder of this Article will use the terms "overbroad" and
46. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 866–67 ("Overbreadth has aptly been termed an
‘ancillary’ doctrine, which should be shaped to reflect the values and concerns that underlie
substantive First Amendment principles."); id. at 856 ("Although overbreadth doctrine rises to
prominence in the heady garden of constitutional law, the roots that define its strength lie in the
rocky and mysterious soil of federal courts doctrines.").
47. If the statute captures too much activity whose regulation does not advance the
purposes of the statute, the statute is not narrowly tailored. If the statute is so narrow that it can
be circumvented easily, the statute loses its justification because there is little reason to burden
the speech covered.
48. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1347 (2000) ("First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does
not stand alone in the category of constitutional tests that require statutes to be relatively fully
specified at the time of their first application and assessed in whole, rather than simply as
applied. Various ‘suspect-content’ tests also occupy this category."). Professor Edward Foley
distinguishes the doctrines along the lines of as-applied and facial challenges. Foley asserts that
the Court in McConnell should first engage in essentially an as-applied narrow tailoring analysis
to determine whether Congress is entitled to regulate some particular example of genuine issue
advocacy. Even if the Court determines that the particular example is improperly regulated, it
still must engage in a substantial overbreadth analysis to determine whether the number of
improper applications is substantially high to warrant facial invalidation of the statute. See
Edward B. Foley, "Narrow Tailoring" Is Not the Opposite of "Overbreadth": Defending
BCRA’s Definition of "Electioneering Communications", 2 ELECTION L.J. 457, 472–78 (2003).
In contrast, this Article focuses on facial challenges with regard to both narrow tailoring and
substantial overbreadth doctrines and does not address as-applied challenges. The Article asks
how a court should determine when a campaign finance statute is so significantly overinclusive
in its invalid applications that it should be struck down as facially invalid under either narrow
tailoring or substantial overbreadth doctrines. Consequently, the distinction between the
doctrines is irrelevant to the primary purpose of this Article.
49. According to Henry Paul Monaghan:
[T]he dominant idea [overbreadth] evokes is serious means scrutiny. Wherever the
law mandates strict or intermediate scrutiny, a requirement of regulatory precision
is involved; a substantial congruence must exist between the regulatory means (the
statute, as construed) and valid legislative ends. Thus, the Court has reacted
interchangeably to "overbreadth" and "least restrictive alternative" challenges both
inside and outside the First Amendment context.
Monaghan, supra note 45, at 37.
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"overinclusive" to refer to overinclusiveness under both the narrow tailoring
and the substantial overbreadth doctrines. The Article will also use the term
"substantial" to refer to the amount of overinclusiveness necessary to trigger
facial invalidation under both doctrines.
Judicial application of the overbreadth doctrine is complicated because
many effective reforms are overinclusive to some degree yet do not require
invalidation. Standard-like regulations allow for an intolerable degree of
prosecutorial discretion, legal uncertainty, and chilling of speech.50 Vagueness
concerns also require that lawmakers craft campaign regulations in the form of
bright-line rules. It is difficult, however, to craft a bright-line rule that
prevents all corruption and also avoids infringing on expression that does not
pose the danger that prompted the regulation. The rule necessarily will be
either underinclusive and allow for circumvention or overinclusive and raise
overbreadth concerns.51
For example, the electioneering provisions allow for circumvention
because corporations and unions may corrupt candidates by threatening to
spend money on attack advertisements prior to the final sixty days of a
campaign. On the other hand, the electioneering provisions are overinclusive
because they restrict speech that is unlikely to corrupt or appear to corrupt the
process, such as a tourism commercial narrated by a popular U.S. Senator that
airs just before an uncontested election. It is practically impossible for
legislatures to provide clearly defined exceptions in the text of a statute for all
of the varied activities that are less likely to corrupt, or appear to corrupt, the
process.52 The failure of any bright-line rule to capture all activity that
implicates the state’s interest and refrain from infringing upon any expressive
activity that does not implicate the state’s interest leads to the core question
unanswered by current doctrine: How should a court determine the extent to
50. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 n.48 (1976) ("[V]ague laws may not only ‘trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning’ or foster ‘arbitrary and discriminatory application’
but also operate to inhibit protected expression by inducing citizens to ‘steer far wider of the
unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’" (quoting
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
51. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) ("A rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy
incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness.").
52. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 112–18 (1991) (observing that rules are
unable to include all of the possible exceptions the rule makers would desire); see also Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1988) (explaining that in
the property context, "over time, the straightforward common law crystalline rules have been
muddied repeatedly by exceptions and equitable second-guessing").
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which a statute may err on the side of overinclusiveness to prevent
circumvention more effectively?
III. The Ambiguity of Overbreadth Doctrine
This Part reviews the conflicting opinions of the Justices in McConnell
and illustrates how the shortcomings of overbreadth doctrine allow judges to
employ personal political assumptions and suppress essential democratic
values in reviewing campaign finance regulations.
A. McConnell v. FEC
In McConnell, the United States Supreme Court upheld almost all of the
provisions of the Act.53 Justices Stevens and O’Connor coauthored a majority
opinion that upheld the electioneering provisions,54 and Justices Breyer,
53. The Court invalidated two relatively minor provisions of the Act. In striking down
the prohibition on contributions by minors, the Court reasoned that the defendants provided
insufficient evidence in support of the ban and asserted that more closely tailored means were
available. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 711 (2003). The Court also invalidated the Act’s
requirement that political parties choose between unlimited independent expenditures and
limited coordinated expenditures to support their candidates. Id. at 700–04.
54. The Stevens/O’Connor opinion also analyzed and upheld the soft money restrictions
(Title I). See id. at 659–70 (upholding BCRA § 323(a), which prohibits national political
parties and their agents from soliciting, receiving, or spending soft money, but construing the
restriction on solicitation by national party officers to allow them to "[sit] down with state and
local party committees or candidates to plan and advise how to raise and spend soft money"); id.
at 670–77 (upholding BCRA § 323(b), which prevents state and local parties from using
contributions that exceed federal regulatory limits to finance "federal election activity"); id. at
678–82 (upholding BCRA § 323(d), which prohibits national, state and local parties from
soliciting funds for or making or directing any donations to certain tax-exempt organizations
that make expenditures in connection with elections for federal office, but construing the
provision narrowly to allow parties to "make or direct donations of money to any tax-exempt
organization that has otherwise been raised in compliance with FECA"); id. at 682–83
(upholding BCRA § 323(e), which limits the ability of federal candidates and officeholders to
solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend soft money in connection with federal, state and local
elections); id. at 683–84 (upholding BCRA § 323(f), which prohibits state and local
officeholders and candidates from spending soft money to fund communications that refer to a
clearly identified candidate for federal office and that promotes, supports, attacks or opposes a
candidate for that office).
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion that addressed BCRA Titles III
(miscellaneous contribution restrictions and other provisions) and IV (provisions related to
severability, effective dates, and judicial review), which was joined in its entirety by Justices
Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, and in part by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and
Thomas. Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion that upheld BCRA Title V (requiring
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Ginsburg, and Souter joined in the Stevens/O’Connor opinion. The opinion
cited with approval past cases that tolerated regulation of express advocacy, 55
equated electioneering communications with express advocacy, and thus
upheld the regulation of electioneering communications.56
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the Constitution prohibits
Congress from regulating spending on communications that do not contain
express advocacy.57 According to the Court, an express advocacy requirement
that broadcasters keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests),
which was joined in its entirety by Justices Ginsburg, O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens.
Hereinafter, this Article’s reference to the "majority opinion" shall mean the opinion coauthored
by Justices Stevens and O’Connor.
55. See id. at 690 ("[T]he important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to
uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements . . . apply in full to BCRA."); id. at 696–97 (quoting
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), for the proposition that
restrictions on corporate spending are necessary to prevent "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth" that "have little or no correlation to the public’s support for
the corporation’s political ideas"). The majority states:
Prior to the enactment of BCRA, FECA required [not-for-profit] corporations, like
business corporations, to pay for their express advocacy from segregated funds
rather than from their general treasuries. Our recent decision in [FEC v. Beaumont]
confirmed that the requirement was valid except insofar as it applied to a subcategory of corporations described as "MCFL organizations" . . . .
Id. at 698.
56. See id. at 689–99 (upholding various provisions related to disclosure of disbursements
on electioneering communications, treatment of coordinated electioneering communications as
contributions, and restrictions on corporate, labor, and not-for-profit corporate disbursements on
electioneering communications). Note that while earlier holdings suggested that restrictions on
political spending by labor unions were constitutional, the Court in McConnell upheld
restrictions on union spending for the first time. Restrictions on non-profit electioneering were
valid as applied to not-for-profits that did not possess the characteristics of "MCFL
organizations." Id. at 699.
57. See id. at 688 ("[O]ur decisions in Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory
language before us; they in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the
permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech."). The Court clarified that
past holdings limiting the regulatory scope of FECA to express advocacy were attempts to
construe regulations of spending on communications "relative to a clearly identified candidate"
and "for the purpose of . . . influencing" a federal election to avoid impermissible vagueness.
Id. at 688. The Court states:
Thus, a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that the express advocacy limitation,
in both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of statutory
interpretation rather than a constitutional command. In narrowly reading the FECA
provisions in Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth, we
nowhere suggested that a statute that was neither vague nor overbroad would be
required to toe the same express advocacy line.
Id. The Court reasoned that the components of the electioneering communication definition
were "easily understood and objectively determinable," and thus raised "none of the vagueness
concerns" that drove the Court’s analysis in Buckley. Id. at 689.
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is "functionally meaningless" because advertisers can easily evade the
requirement and the line "has not aided the legislative effort to combat real or
apparent corruption."58 The Court concluded that the justifications for
regulating express advocacy apply equally to ads that do not contain express
advocacy but are "intended to influence the voters’ decisions and have that
effect."59
In two paragraphs that briefly explained its rejection of plaintiffs’
overbreadth claims, the Court stated that:
We are therefore not persuaded that plaintiffs have carried their heavy
burden . . . . Even if we assumed that BCRA will inhibit some
constitutionally protected corporate and union speech, that assumption
would not "justify prohibiting all enforcement" of the law unless its
application to protected speech is substantial, "not only in an absolute
sense, but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate
applications." Far from establishing that BCRA’s application to pure issue
ads is substantial, either in an absolute sense or relative to its application to
election-related advertising, the record strongly supports the contrary
conclusion.60

Justice Kennedy dissented in a separate opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.61 The Kennedy dissent acknowledged that
regulation of spending on express advocacy is easy to circumvent62 and
generally agreed with the majority’s decision to uphold the provisions
requiring disclosure of the electioneering communications.63 The dissent
58. Id.
59. Id. at 696.
60. Id. at 696–97 (citations omitted).
61. Justice Thomas also concluded that the electioneering provisions were overbroad.
Unlike the other eight Justices on the Court, however, Justice Thomas interpreted Buckley to
require that "any regulation of political speech beyond communications using words of express
advocacy is unconstitutional." Id. at 737 (Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice
Thomas, Buckley construed the statutory language regulating independent expenditures to be
limited to express advocacy not merely to enhance their clarity, but to narrow their coverage.
Id. at 739 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the express advocacy test was adopted to
"avoid problems of overbreadth" (citing FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 248 (1986)). For a more detailed analysis of Justice Thomas’s approach, see infra text
accompanying notes 139–41.
62. See id. at 761 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Government and the majority are right
about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to
circumvent.").
63. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that the electioneering disclosure provisions
are substantially related to state interests, but noting that requirements that expenditures be
disclosed before electioneering communications have aired impose unconstitutional burdens on
speech).
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concluded, however, that the restrictions on corporate and union electioneering
spending were overinclusive. The opinion described the provision, "with its
crude temporal and geographic proxies," as "a severe and unprecedented ban
on protected speech"64 because reference to an elected official often facilitates
communication about pending legislation and other matters that pose no threat
of corruption. The Kennedy dissent concluded that:
[The restriction on corporate and union electioneering] is a comprehensive
censor: On the pain of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a
candidate for federal office during the crucial weeks before an election . . . .
In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial
overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may bring
as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out of
bounds as [the restriction on corporate and union electioneering], our law
simply does not force speakers to "undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation."
If they instead "abstain from protected speech," they "har[m] not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas." Not the least of the ill effects of today’s decision is
that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protection for free speech,
has now been manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its
former self.65

B. Normative Judgments
The prohibition on overbreadth forbids a statute from restricting a
substantial amount of speech that does not pose the threat that the regulation
was intended to prevent.66 But, even after McConnell, normative questions

64. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 769–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 120–21 (1991) (asserting that although the state has a compelling interest in
compensating criminal victims, there is not a compelling government interest in limiting such
compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoers’ speech); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 (1985) (finding federal law that dealt with the
independent expenditures of political action committees to be overbroad because it restricted a
number of activities that posed no threat of corruption or the appearance of corruption); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978) (explaining that a Massachusetts
statute that would prevent a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal
even if its shareholders unanimously authorized a contribution or expenditure was
overinclusive).
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remain. For example, how much speech constitutes a "substantial" amount?67
A statute that regulates a single case of speech not implicating the state interest
is probably not substantially overbroad.68 Courts have not provided guidance,
however, on the number or proportion of instances of such speech that will
trigger the doctrine.
Granted, in its discussion of the soft money contribution restrictions, the
majority opinion in McConnell required only that contribution limits be
"closely drawn" rather than "narrowly tailored" to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption.69 The Court stated that this less rigorous standard of
review "provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to
concerns about circumvention of regulations designed to protect the integrity
of the political process."70 The opinion failed to specify, however, the amount
of protected activity that a regulation must restrict before facial invalidation is
warranted under the baseline "narrowly tailored" standard or how much more
regulation of protected expressive activity a judge applying the "closely
drawn" standard should tolerate.
The McConnell majority opinion provided even less guidance as to how
judges should review corporate and labor spending restrictions. Outside of
concluding that the amount of protected speech covered by the electioneering
provisions was not "substantial," the majority in McConnell did not detail how
future courts should determine whether a restriction on corporate or labor
spending has exceeded the extent of prophylactic room Congress enjoys in the
area.71
67. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 893 ("The hard question, normatively as well as
doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a statute’s overbreadth ought to be gauged."); Hasen,
supra note 45, at 1782 ("The term ‘substantial’ is hardly self-defining, and the Court in
Broadrick did not offer much guidance. Thus, it is difficult to know how to apply the rule of
substantial overbreadth.").
68. See Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court had "never held that a statute should be held invalid on its face merely because it
is possible to conceive of a single impermissible application").
69. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2210–2211
(2003)); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (stating that
with regard to contribution limits, "the dollar amount of the limit need not be ‘fine tuned’").
70. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 656–57; see also Federal Election Commission v. NRWC,
459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (upholding restriction on a nonprofit corporation’s solicitation of
contributions, stating that the Court will not "second-guess a legislative determination as to the
need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared").
71. Earlier holdings have provided mixed signals about the tailoring of corporate and
labor spending restrictions. On one hand, the Court in Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL)
invalidated a spending restriction on nonprofit corporations, stating that "[w]here at all possible,
government must curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at
hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does not pose the danger that has prompted
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Not only did the majority opinion in McConnell fail to adopt sufficiently
defined tools, it did not explain its decision in a way that would provide
guidance for future courts.72 Whereas the lower court judge who concluded
that the electioneering provisions were not overbroad devoted over a dozen
pages to analyzing the issue,73 the Stevens/O’Connor majority opinion
dedicated just two conclusory paragraphs to it.74 Granted, the Justices who
joined the Stevens/O’Connor opinion might have intended to refrain from
articulating a broad judicial pronouncement about overbreadth that could
obstruct future legislative attempts to respond to corruption or license
excessive legislative infringement on expressive activities.75 Or perhaps the
Justices in the majority agreed that the electioneering provisions should be
upheld but did not want to highlight the divisions in their reasoning.76
regulation." MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986). The Court determined that the spending
restriction as applied to nonprofits in MCFL was "too blunt an instrument for such a delicate
task." Id. Cf. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 642 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Broad prophylactic bans on campaign
expenditures and contributions are not designed with the precision required by the First
Amendment because they sweep protected speech within their prohibitions."). On the other
hand, the Court in Austin stated a corporate spending restriction that covered less wealthy
corporations that posed little threat of corruption was not overbroad because poorer corporations
"receive from the State the special benefits conferred by the corporate structure and present the
potential for distorting the political process." Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 661 (1990) (emphasis added).
72. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004) (available at www.ssrn.com) ("[T]he joint majority opinion [in McConnell]
fails to engage in a serious analysis of the potential overbreadth issues raised by regulating
election-time advertisements that may not in fact be intended to influence and may not even
affect federal elections.").
73. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 625–39 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two judges who voted to invalidate the
electioneering provisions as overbroad also collectively dedicated several pages to analyzing the
issue. See id. at 367–70 (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 792–99
(Leon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. See supra text accompanying note 60 (quoting the McConnell majority).
75. See Spencer Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3
ELECTION L.J. 305, 309 (2004) (" . . . McConnell also teaches that a court reviewing campaign
finance regulations should avoid bloated opinions containing unbounded dicta not necessary to
support the decision reached by the court . . . . Prolonged opinions that provide elaborate
rationalizations are more likely to obstruct future legislative and judicial attempts to respond to
context-specific problems."); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1733, 1755 (1995) ("Once offered publicly, reasons may therefore apply to cases that
the court, in justifying a particular decision, does not have before it . . . . Whenever a court
offers reasons, there is a risk of future regret . . . . The constraint produced by the reason may
limit discretion and promote predictability, but it may also produce a bad result.").
76. See Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1733 ("When the convergence on particular outcomes
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Whatever the rationale, the Court’s failure to provide more substantive
guidance, either in its prior cases or in McConnell, allows judges’ normative
and empirical assumptions about politics to animate their overbreadth
decisions in the campaign finance context.
Indeed, not only did the Court in McConnell fail to provide guidance, but
the Justices’ conflicting opinions illustrate the problems that arise from
existing overbreadth doctrine. The differences between the Stevens/O’Connor
majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent stem in part from different
normative assumptions of the Justices about the value of the expressive
activity restricted and the state interest advanced by the regulation.77
For example, the majority opinion focused on the electioneering
provisions’ reduction of circumvention of laws designed to prevent corruption.
Although the Court explicitly acknowledged that the "precise percentage of
[restricted] issue ads" that "had no electioneering purpose" was "a matter of
dispute," it recognized that "the vast majority of ads" clearly had an
electioneering purpose.78 From the majority’s perspective, the number of
advertisements that did not influence federal elections represented a minority
of the total ads regulated by the statute, and therefore the statute should not be
considered overbroad.
In contrast, the Kennedy dissent focused on the importance of the speech
improperly restricted by the electioneering provisions. The opinion presented
a hypothetical in which the electioneering provisions prevent a nonprofit
environmental group from running an ad opposing a proposed law that would
allow more logging in national forests.79 According to the Kennedy dissent, a
reference to the incumbent sponsors of the bill might be the most effective way
to communicate with the public about the merits of the bill, as the names of the

is incompletely theorized, it is because the relevant actors are clear on the result without being
clear, either in their own minds or on paper, on the most general theory that accounts for it.").
77. The divergent decisions of three lower court judges in McConnell v. FEC also
illustrate the challenges courts face in determining the normative meaning of "substantial"
overbreadth. United States District Court Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly wrote that the
"overwhelming majority" of the ads restricted under the new law were designed to affect
elections and voted to uphold the definition of electioneering communication. McConnell, 251
F. Supp. 2d at 633. District Court Judge Richard Leon believed that up to 17% of the speech
restricted did not pose a threat of corruption and voted to strike down the primary provision as
"substantially overbroad." Id. at 777. District of Columbia Circuit Court Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson asserted that any regulation of spending on political speech was substantially
overbroad unless all of the speech regulated included "express advocacy." She therefore voted
to invalidate the provision. Id. at 293.
78. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 696.
79. Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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bill’s sponsors might have become synonymous with the proposal80 or the
well-known ideological biases of the sponsors might provide essential
information to citizens about the content of the bill.81 Because the sponsors
otherwise possess strong environmental records or face little competition, the
environmental group lacks any interest in corrupting the process by
threatening to spend vast sums to defeat the incumbents.82
While the Kennedy dissent did not identify definitively the proportion of
ads without an electioneering purpose,83 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Scalia thought that the hypothetical environmental group’s ads
and similar forms of expression are incredibly important to communicating
with citizens and elected officials about legislative matters. In light of the
importance of this speech, these Justices concluded that the statute was
overbroad.
The disagreement between the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent
stems from different value-based judgments about the normative definition of
"substantial" overbreadth. The Kennedy dissent emphasized unfettered
spending and believed that speech like that of the hypothetical environmental
group was sufficiently valuable that the costs of its restriction would outweigh
the benefits that would result from legitimate applications of the statute. An
emphasis on other important values—the prevention of corruption and the
appearance thereof—led the majority to reject the overbreadth claim.
To illustrate, assume that Senator Green and Senator Soot introduce the
pro-logging Green-Soot Act a few weeks before election day and that due to
news coverage the pro-logging bill is synonymous with the names of the two
senators. Senator Green has a strong pro-environment record and has little
competition in his reelection bid. On the other hand, Senator Soot has a
history of rolling back environmental protections and faces a tightly contested
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990) (commenting that in previous
decisions, overbreadth has not only had to be "real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep" (quoting Broadrick v. Okla., 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)));
see also Fallon, supra note 38, at 893–94 (stating that the Supreme Court has "occasionally tried
to express the substantiality requirement in terms of a geometric proportion. The proper
comparison, it has been suggested, is between the number of cases to which a court might
constitutionally apply a statute, and the number of cases in which the statute’s application
would violate constitutional rights."); Hasen, supra note 45, at 1783 ("[T]he question of
substantial overbreadth involves a comparative effort; one looks at the proportion of overbroad
applications of the statute compared to legitimate ones . . . . [T]he substantial overbreadth
requirement, however, . . . fails to define the relevant proportion.").
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election. Also imagine that the electioneering provisions would prevent the
environmental group from threatening to run one hundred candidate
advertisements attacking Senator Soot that are, for the sake of argument,
corrupting. The group also plans to run ten advertisements in Green’s state
detailing the problems with the Green-Soot bill that pose no threat of
corruption.84
The focus by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
on preventing the corrupting influence of the one hundred attack ads might
lead them to believe that the ten Green-Soot issue advertisements do not
constitute a "substantial" amount of speech. Plaintiffs, after all, can bring a
claim challenging the electioneering communications as applied to the ten
Green-Soot advertisements.
Even if Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia accepted the premise
that corporate attack ads corrupted politics, their focus on the importance of
the ten Green-Soot issue advertisements would likely lead them to the
conclusion that such speech constituted a "substantial" amount. To this group,
the option to challenge these specific instances on an as-applied basis is
inadequate. The possibility that the statute’s language or the cost of filing a
lawsuit will chill speech outweighs the importance of preventing any threat of
corruption posed by the one hundred attack advertisements.85
The Justices’ varied approaches to weighing the properly regulated
activity against improperly regulated activity also stems, in part, from
differences in their normative understandings of the state interest that justifies
restrictions on campaign spending. For example, the Justices who joined the
Stevens/O’Connor majority opinion accepted that restrictions on corporate
spending on express advocacy are necessary to prevent "the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas."86 According to the
84. Note that one can argue that advertisements about bills named after congressional
sponsors could corrupt candidates, just as a threatened attack on a bill in its sponsor’s home
district could be construed as an attack on the sponsor for whom the bill is named.
85. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 769–70 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that as-applied
challenges are considerably burdensome, and that if speakers "‘abstain from protected speech,’
they ‘har[m] not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas’")
86. Id. The majority expanded its discussion of the meaning of corruption in its
discussion of the soft money restrictions. The majority conceived of the legitimate state interest
in regulating political contributions not merely as preventing quid pro quo corruption, but also
curbing "undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence."
Id. at 746. A quid-pro-quo view of corruption "ignores precedent, common sense, and the
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majority, the question of whether the state interest in restricting corporate
spending is compelling was "easily answered" by prior campaign finance
decisions that "represent respect for the ‘legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful
regulation.’"87 In evaluating the expressive activities that properly fall under
the scope of the electioneering provisions, therefore, the majority included
corporate and labor spending on communications that are intended to influence
voters’ decisions in candidate elections and have that effect.88
Justices who joined the Kennedy dissent, on the other hand, would strike
down all regulations other than those necessary to prevent quid pro quo
corruption.89 Justice Kennedy indicated that the "corrosive and distorting"
corruption rationale used to justify restrictions on corporate and union
spending in candidate elections is amorphous, unbounded, and unjustified and
should be overruled.90 As Justice Kennedy wrote, "The mere fact that an ad
may, in one fashion or another, influence an election is an insufficient reason
for outlawing it. I should have thought influencing elections to be the whole
point of political speech."91 According to the Kennedy dissent, corporate and
labor spending represent critical political activity that should remain
unrestricted.92
realities of political fundraising . . . ." Id. at 665. Corruption is not evidenced by altered
legislative votes alone, but may also result in less obvious distortions, such as "manipulations of
the legislative calendar" or the sale of "access." Id. at 666. In the absence of regulation, the
special access given to large contributors results in an appearance of corruption that erodes
public confidence and participation in the political process. See id. at 664–65 (observing that
large contributions result in access to high-level government officials, and that such access
results in an appearance of corruption); id. at 656 ("Because the electoral process is the very
‘means through which a free society democratically translates political speech into concrete
governmental action,’ . . . contribution limits . . . tangibly benefit public participation in
political debate.").
87. Id. at 695 (quoting FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2207 (2003) (quoting FEC v.
Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1982))).
88. See id. at 696 ("The justifications for the regulation of express advocacy apply equally
to ads aired during those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’ decisions and
have that effect.").
89. See id. at 747 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The majority
ignores the quid pro quo nature of the regulated conduct central to our earlier decisions.").
90. Id. at 762 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and
vibrant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles
consistent with the First Amendment.").
91. Id. at 770 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "the
majority’s ready willingness to equate corruption with all organizations adopting the corporate
form is a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long
enriched our civic dialogue").
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Consequently, even though the Kennedy dissent purports to accept the
state interest in restricting corporate spending for the sake of analyzing the
overbreadth of the electioneering provisions,93 it should not be surprising that
the dissent places less weight on the benefits gained by the electioneering
provisions’ limitation on corporate and union spending.94 The varied
approaches of the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent stem, in part,
from different normative assessments of the weight to give the state interest
advanced by the electioneering restrictions.
C. Empirical Assumptions
In addition to normative judgments about the meaning of "substantial"
overbreadth, the Justices and litigants in McConnell made politically-charged
empirical assumptions. These questions are factual, such as the percentage of
regulated activities that if unregulated would pose no threat of corruption.
For example, although the majority opinion refused to specify the precise
percentage of issue ads regulated by the electioneering provisions that had no
electioneering purpose and thus presumably posed little threat of corruption, it
found that the "vast majority of ads" clearly had an electioneering purpose.95
Thus, the Court concluded, "[f]ar from establishing that BCRA’s application to
pure issue ads is substantial . . . the record strongly supports the contrary
conclusion."96 While the Kennedy dissent also avoided specifying the precise
percentage of speech improperly covered by the electioneering provisions, it
did claim the provisions constitute "a severe and unprecedented ban on
protected speech . . . . Never before in our history has the Court upheld a law
that suppresses speech to this extent."97
Both the majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent rely on the Justices’
own empirical assumptions about whether particular instances of speech
covered by the regulation pose a threat or appearance of corruption. While the
Justices do not elaborate on these assumptions in their opinions, a debate
between the parties to the litigation illustrates the conflict. Because of their
93. Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Even under Austin,
BCRA § 203 could not stand . . . . § 203 . . . is far from narrowly tailored.").
94. See id. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The severe
First Amendment burden of this ban on [corporate and union] independent expenditures requires
much stronger justifications than the majority offers.").
95. Id. at 696.
96. Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 768–69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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emphasis on unfettered speech, plaintiffs cited the following advertisement
sponsored by the American Association of Health Plans as a "true issue
advertisement that would be unfairly captured" by the electioneering
provisions:
Worried about rising health-care costs? Then look out for the trial lawyers.
They want Congress to pass new liability laws that could overwhelm the
system with expensive new health care lawsuits. Lawsuits that could make
trial lawyers richer. That could make health care unaffordable for millions.
Senator Lauch Faircloth is fighting to stop the trial lawyers[’] new laws.
Call him today and tell him to keep up his fight. Because if trial lawyers
win, working families lose.98

The defendants countered that the advertisement was designed to
influence an election, posed a threat of corruption, and therefore implicated the
government interest advanced by the electioneering provisions. Senator Lauch
Faircloth was in a close race against trial lawyer John Edwards. Other
advertisements portrayed Edwards as a "deceptive, truth-stretching trial
lawyer."99 In this context, the defendants argued, the tag line of the American
Association of Health Plans’ advertisement "may as well have read ‘if John
Edwards wins, working families lose.’"100
The Justices also make different empirical assumptions about the burden
on speech under the electioneering provisions. The majority assumes that
corporations and unions can easily engage in political advocacy by paying for
an ad from a separate PAC.101 According to the Kennedy dissent’s assessment
of political reality, however, a PAC does not effectively represent the views of
the "corporation as a corporation,"102 a PAC does not allow the public to
evaluate the credibility of the organizational speaker,103 and complex and
98. Brief for McConnell Plaintiffs, supra note 30, at app. 9a.
99. Opposition Brief of Defendants at 82, McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176
(D.D.C. 2003) (No. 02-0582), available at http://sitepilot.firmseek.com/client/clc/www
/attachment.html/F+Electioneering+Communications.pdf?id=379.
100. Id.
101. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 695 ("Because corporations can still fund electioneering
communications with PAC money, it is ‘simply wrong’ to view the provision as a ‘complete
ban’ on expression rather than a regulation . . . . The PAC option allows corporate political
participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence . . . ." (quoting
FEC v. Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2211 (2003))).
102. Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What the law
allows—permitting the corporation ‘to serve as the founder and treasurer of a different
association of individuals that can endorse or oppose political candidates’—‘is not speech by
the corporation.’" (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 681
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
103. Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
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burdensome PAC regulations chill speech by several organizations.104
Whereas the majority surmises that corporations and unions can effectively
engage in genuine issue advocacy by avoiding a reference to a federal
candidate,105 Justice Kennedy believes that avoiding a reference to a federal
candidate diminishes the communicative effectiveness of many issue ads to an
intolerable degree.106 While each of the conflicting versions of political reality is
plausible, the Justices fail to ground their empirical assumptions in an extensive
evidentiary record.
As illustrated by the examples above, empirical assumptions by the Justices
and the litigants often involve ad hoc, contestable conjecture about the frequency
of electioneering spending, the probability that unregulated spending will corrupt
the political process, the extent of such corruption, and the feasibility of
alternative avenues of expression under the regulations.107 Such speculation also
extends to the probability and extent to which the electioneering provisions will
prevent corruption, the frequency of activities that will not pose a threat of
corruption being regulated,108 and the probability that less restrictive alternatives
will prevent an equal amount of corruption.
states:
Forcing speech through an artificial "secondhand endorsement structure . . .
debases the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate speakers . . . [because] PAC’s
are interim, ad hoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility." In
contrast, their sponsoring organizations "have a continuity, a stability, and an
influence" that allows "their members and the public at large to evaluate their . . .
credibility."
Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 708–09 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
104. Id. at 766–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[PAC]
regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives
for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most
difficulty bearing the costs of compliance.").
105. Id. at 696 ("Moreover, whatever the precise percentage may have been in the past, in
the future corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads during those time frames by
simply avoiding any specific reference to federal candidates . . . .").
106. See id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referencing
situations in which the identity of a bill’s sponsors provides "essential instruction to citizens on
whether the policy benefits them or their community" or when the sponsors have become so
synonymous with the proposal that reference to the politicians "is the most effective way to
communicate with the public").
107. Cf. Elliot L. Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65
HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1951) (discussing clear and present danger, and arguing that the "ultimate
question of constitutionality depends . . . on subsidiary determinations with respect to
probability, gravity, and necessity").
108. According to Richard H. Fallon, Jr.:
The hard question, normatively as well as doctrinally, is how the substantiality of a
statute’s overbreadth ought to be gauged. The Supreme Court has occasionally
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The current doctrine’s failure to provide guidance allows normative and
empirical political assumptions to drive the litigants’ arguments and judicial
decisionmaking.109 In the absence of clearer doctrinal guidance, many judges
inclined to favor a campaign regulation can find some plausible explanation as to
how it prevents at least the appearance of corruption or provides adequate avenues
for expressive activity.110 Judges skeptical of reform can imagine a multitude of
activities that might arise in the future and would fall under the statute, but that
would not corrupt the process.111 In summary, the seemingly neutral application
tried to express the substantiality requirement in terms of a geometric proportion.
The proper comparison, it has suggested, is between the number of cases to which a
court might constitutionally apply a statute, and the number of cases in which the
statute’s application would violate constitutional rights.
Fallon, supra note 38, at 893–94.
109. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that a prominent characteristic
of a case that involves a political question may be "the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion"); Frederick Schauer,
Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1332 n.18 (1994) ("In
the absence of the canonical formulation, judicial power to create and, at the same time, apply
the analogizing rule likely locates much of the purchase for the judge’s decision in what the
judge believes the result in the present case simply ought to be.").
110. Compare Beaumont, 123 S. Ct. at 2211 (concluding that prohibition on contributions
by certain nonprofits is "closely drawn" because nonprofits can establish segregated political
action committees), Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395–96 (reasoning that state contribution limits are
adequately tailored because candidates can still amass resources needed for effective advocacy),
Austin, 494 U.S. at 661 (concluding that restriction on corporate spending that includes less
wealthy corporations is "not substantially overbroad" because less wealthy corporations
"present the potential for distorting the political process"), and Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that regulations restricting corporate
spending properly extend to nonprofit corporations because the differences between nonprofit
and business corporations are "‘distinctions in degree’ that do not amount to ‘differences in
kind’"), with Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 642–43 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that restriction on coordinated
party spending is not narrowly tailored because "the statute indiscriminately covers the many
conceivable instances in which a party committee could exceed the spending limits without any
intent to extract an unlawful commitment from a candidate"), Austin, 494 U.S. at 688 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that restriction on corporate spending is not narrowly tailored because it
applies to less wealthy corporations that lack "amassed ‘war chests’"), Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. at 263 (observing that restriction on corporate spending improperly included
certain nonprofit corporations because they "have features more akin to voluntary political
associations than business firms"), and First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 794 (reasoning
that the "overinclusiveness" of restriction on corporate spending on ballot questions to protect
dissenting shareholders is demonstrated by fact that restriction also bans corporate spending
unanimously authorized by shareholders).
111. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 233–34
(1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (adopting Blackmun’s concurrence in Illinois State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 188–89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[F]or me, ‘least drastic means’ is a
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of the conventional overbreadth doctrine conceals judges’ and litigants’ valueladen empirical assumptions and normative aspirations for democracy.
D. The Costs of Ambiguity
Significant costs accompany the doctrine’s failure to provide courts with
adequate guidance in resolving questions about campaign regulations that are
heavily charged with partisan political interests. As explained by many
commentators, improper judicial deference to campaign reforms may result in
excessive suppression of expressive and associational values.112 The lack of
guidance provided by the doctrine allows for the charge that the majority’s
opinion was driven by ideology rather than law.113
On the other hand, unnecessary judicial invalidation of campaign
regulations infringes on legislative authority.114 Article I, Section 4 of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate federal elections.115
slippery slope . . . . A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby
enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.").
112. See, e.g., Robert Bauer, McConnell, Parties and the Decline of the Right of
Association, 3 ELECTION L.J. 199 (2004) (asserting that McConnell failed to address the impact
of the challenged campaign regulations on associational rights); Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell
v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley’s First Amendment, 3 ELECTION L.J. 127, 145 (2004) (asserting
that in dissenting in McConnell, "Justice Scalia was surely right when he bemoaned the ‘sad day
for the freedom of speech.’") (quoting McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 720 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)); Hasen, supra note 72 (asserting that "[t]he result [of McConnell] is
jurisprudential incoherence and a lead opinion in the most important campaign finance case in a
generation that appears to pay only cursory attention to the First Amendment interests that must
be balanced in evaluating any campaign finance regime").
113. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology
Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2004) ("Ideology, not a careful
consideration of facts, theory, or the real-world effects of legislation, appears to drive the
majority to repeatedly fashion its opinion in such categorical terms.").
114. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that prominent characteristics
of a case involving a political question may be "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department" or "the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government"). Unlike Baker, which involved a state legislature’s decisionmaking,
the McConnell litigation involves some questions to be decided by Congress, a political branch
of government co-equal with the Court.
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The times, places and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of
choosing Senators."); see also Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform: Central
Meaning and a New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 838–39 (2003) (asserting that the
Guarantee Clause’s mandate to protect the republican form of government in the states
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Nebulous overbreadth doctrines fail either to constrain judicial power from
infringing upon the discretion entrusted to the legislature by the Constitution
or to give notice to legislatures and citizens as to how courts will implement
the Constitution’s balance of individual rights and lawmaking.116 Improper
judicial invalidation sacrifices the state’s interest in preventing the corruption
and the appearance of corruption that flow from the activities that the statute
would have otherwise regulated.117 One rationalization for judicial
hypersensitivity to campaign regulation is a special concern for speech, but
erring on that side of the scale is not without social and constitutional costs.
Unique problems in applying the overbreadth doctrine to review
campaign finance regulations arise from the political nature of the context as
well as the institutional limitations of courts. Campaign finance implicates not
only individual rights but also values related to political structure, such as
democratic deliberation, widespread participation, and electoral competition.118
Judicial decisions in the campaign finance context are likely to result in
unanticipated consequences or become obsolete due to legal, technological,
and social changes in campaign methods and fund-raising practices. Unlike
legislatures, federal judges do not regularly consider questions of political
structure and are not democratically accountable. Further, courts possess
fewer comprehensive fact-finding tools to make judgments about political
activities and regulations.
empowers Congress to enact campaign finance reform).
116. Cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (noting that a prominent characteristic of a case involving
a political question may be "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving" the case).
117. See Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2197 (2003) ("[T]here are substantial social
costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally
unprotected speech . . . . To ensure that these costs do not swallow the social benefits of
declaring a law ‘overbroad,’ we have insisted that a law’s application to protected speech be
‘substantial.’").
118. Scholars have recognized structural issues in other areas of the law of democracy.
See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1666 (2001) (arguing that vote dilution claims cannot be squeezed into the conventional
individual-rights framework that the Court has chosen); Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term: [E]Racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 113 (1994)
(emphasizing the inadequacy of existing voting rights jurisprudence for handling claims
involving racial groups); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) (asserting that
the judiciary "invert[s] the focus of constitutional doctrine from the foreground of rights and
equality to the background rules that structure partisan political competition"); Daniel R. Ortiz,
From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1999) (observing that election
law’s evolution "has led us away from a largely rights-based, individual-centered view of
politics, to a more pragmatic and structural view of politics as a matter of institutional
arrangements").

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN REFORM

695

In light of the institutional limitations of courts, the political nature of
campaign finance, and the important democratic values furthered by both the
political use of money and the regulation of such use, judges need more
guidance than the current overbreadth doctrine provides.119 Commentators and
courts have extensively analyzed the manageability of doctrines and
competing democratic values in other contexts, such as the relative population
of legislative districts,120 partisan gerrymandering,121 the use of race in
implementing the Voting Rights Act,122 and ballot-access cases.123 Although
adequate doctrinal guidance is crucial to judicial review of campaign finance
regulations, the issue remains largely unexamined.124

119. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (articulating that a variety of indicators
may suggest that a case involves a nonjusticiable political question, including "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [an issue]; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion").
120. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124 (1980) (explaining that the Court
adopted a one-person, one-vote rule "precisely because of considerations of administrability").
121. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 155–56 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that the standard adopted by the plurality will "prove unmanageable and arbitrary" and
result in "greater judicial intrusion into the apportionment process"); see also Peter H. Schuck,
The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1334 (1987) (outlining a test requiring that the electoral system be
arranged to frustrate voting groups’ influence on the political process).
122. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1012 & n.9 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(observing the difficulty and practical impossibility of discerning the primary motive of the
legislature in the apportionment process); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 508 (1993) (observing that judicial
review of expressive harms of racial considerations in redistricting recognized in Shaw is
"fraught with complexity and unlikely to yield determinate, single right answers").
123. See Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Process, 2002 SUP.
CT. REV. 95, 115–30 (2002) (discussing various judicial approaches to ballot-access cases).
124. In the aftermath of Buckley v. Valeo, Judge Harold Leventhal highlighted courts’
relative inexperience with problems of political organization, and counseled judges to proceed
pragmatically and carefully, to avoid a rush to judgment based on speculation, and to avoid
dogma that precludes reconsideration and correction. Harold Leventhal, Courts and Political
Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 376, 378–80, 387 (1977). While he emphasized the
importance of judicial humility and caution in reviewing campaign finance regulations, Judge
Leventhal did not explore doctrines that would provide judicial guidance. See generally id.
Richard Briffault observed that courts tolerate greater regulation of activities closer to elections,
that similar treatment should extend to the regulation of political money, and that a statute like
the Act is closer to elections and should be rendered constitutional. See generally Richard
Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999).
Briffault did not explain, however, how courts should determine the "elections/politics" line.
See generally id.
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IV. The Rigidity of Bright-Line Judicial Rules

Courts have devised various tests to aid them in balancing individual
rights and lawmaking as they believe the Constitution intended.125 Courts
have created these tools both to constrain judicial power from infringing upon
the discretion entrusted to the legislature by the Constitution and to give notice
to society as to how courts will implement the Constitution. The tools
determine the appropriate scope of legislative authority over campaign
finance, or what this Article refers to as the boundaries of campaign reform.
As illustrated above, overbreadth doctrine both prior to and in the
aftermath of McConnell provides inadequate direction to judges in determining
the appropriate boundaries of reform. A judicial tool in the form of either a
bright-line rule or a balancing test that weighs clearly identified values would
provide greater guidance to courts. This Part analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of four alternative rule-based tests that the Court might adopt. It
ultimately concludes that the rules overlook important democratic values and
are too rigid to respond to the evolving nature of campaign practices and
reforms.
The two most straightforward rules involve either judicial tolerance of
almost all reforms or judicial invalidation of all reforms. Courts could also
adopt fixed categories of the particular campaign activities that political bodies
may regulate. For example, the Court could adopt a content-based judicial
rule that invalidates all statutes that purport to regulate spending on speech that
does not contain express advocacy. The Court could also craft a
multidimensional rule that allows regulation of activities based on
predetermined factors related not only to content, but also to timing, audience,
and speaker identity.
A. Deference to Reforms
Some have proposed that the judiciary defer to legislative decisions
regarding campaign finance,126 and this approach would provide greater
125. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57, 67–75 (1997) (outlining the tests developed by the
Supreme Court in defining constitutional doctrine).
126. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 24, 46 (1998) (claiming that "the overall electoral process, including campaignoriented speech, should be viewed as a special governmental institution" which can be regulated
by legislatures); Briffault, supra note 124, at 1768 ("Election-related activities are different, and
necessarily subject to more regulation, than other forms of political activity."); Frederick
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guidance to judges than current doctrine.127 Proponents of a passive judiciary
assert that judges should allow campaign finance battles to occur in the
political, rather than in the judicial, arena. Democracy requires that people use
democracy to decide how democracy will be structured.128 Courts tolerate
other restrictions in the election context, such as prohibitions on campaigning
within 100 feet of a polling place,129 because such restrictions promote
democratic deliberation.130
The deference approach would uphold not only the electioneering
provisions’ disclosure requirements and spending restrictions but also the
remainder of the Act. The campaign finance structure as a whole could
operate as Congress intended.131 Further, deference would allow more
Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1803, 1804 (1999) (exploring whether "electoral politics—or even elections simpliciter—
could also be the subject of special election-specific First Amendment principles because of
their special role in democracy").
127. See Pamela S. Karlan, Exit Strategies in Constitutional Law: Lessons for Getting the
Least Dangerous Branch Out of the Political Thicket, 82 B.U. L. REV. 667, 698 (2002)
(asserting that, with regard to the Shaw v. Reno cases, the Court can disentangle itself from "the
political thicket" by "recast[ing] the form of review in highly deferential terms, and leav[ing]
enforcement of this constitutional constraint to the political branches, as [the Court] did in the
areas of economic due process and the Commerce Clause").
128. See Schauer, supra note 109, at 1335 (articulating the argument that "if the people
cannot in democratic fashion make decisions about what their democracy will look like, then
the notion of democracy is hollow").
129. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that because "the exercise
of free speech rights conflicts with [the fundamental] right to cast a ballot in an election free
from the taint of intimidation and fraud . . . some restricted zone around polling places is
necessary to protect that fundamental right").
130. See Schauer & Pildes, supra note 126, at 1817 ("The justification of these structures is
that they promote a ‘fairer’ mode of representation, that they enhance the deliberative quality of
choosing candidates and making policy, or that they improve the quality of voter
decisionmaking.").
131. Cf. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 659 ("Because the five challenged provisions of § 323
implicate different First Amendment concerns, we discuss them separately. We are mindful,
however, that Congress enacted § 323 as an integrated whole to vindicate the Government’s
important interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption."); Spencer
Overton, Judicial Modesty and the Lessons of McConnell v. FEC, 3 ELECTION L.J. 305, 313
(2004) ("Campaign finance statutes often work ‘as an integrated whole,’ and a judge who
carelessly invalidates a minor provision might unwittingly poke a hole in the entire regulatory
structure."). Indeed, one might argue that many current problems stem from the Court’s failure
to appreciate the structural nature of campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo. By upholding
individual contribution limits but invalidating candidate spending limits the Court in Buckley
limited the supply of money but created an unlimited demand, thereby placing a premium on
large contributions. In a dissent in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC Justice Kennedy
asserted that the Court’s prior invalidation of spending limitations resulted in adverse,
unintended consequences, such as issue advocacy and soft money. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t
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expansive reforms such as restrictions on individual and candidate spending,
essentially overruling Buckley v. Valeo.132
One approach to deference would involve the Court declaring challenges
to campaign finance regulations nonjusticiable and exiting the field altogether.
However, while a judicial declaration that all challenges to campaign finance
regulations are nonjusticiable provides guidance to judges, it ignores important
First Amendment values. Courts protect speech from regulation to preserve
individual autonomy and to prevent incumbent legislators from enacting
speech regulations designed to disadvantage political challengers. Complete
deference to democratic decisionmaking in the campaign finance context
would sacrifice these values. In the alternative, the Court might adopt a
rational-basis standard to review reforms.133 Unlike nonjusticiability, rationalbasis review might allow the Court to invalidate laws that infringe on
individual autonomy or entrench incumbent politicians to a great extent.134
Legislators, however, would likely enact statutes that favor incumbents to
different degrees to test judicial willingness to invalidate such laws. To many
legislators, the gains of tempering electoral competition probably outweigh the
embarrassment of voting for a law that a court invalidates as entrenching.
Further, the more often a court invalidates such legislation, the more complex
the process becomes for future courts to determine the appropriate boundaries
of legislative authority.
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409–10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39–59 (1976) (discussing and invalidating
restrictions on individual and candidate expenditure limits).
133. See Karlan, supra note 127, at 686–88 (describing the evolution of economic
substantive due process doctrine and suggesting that the adoption of a new standard for election
law cases may allow the Supreme Court to extricate itself from the campaign finance issue);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 38–39 (discussing the Court’s options of nonjusticiability or
rational-basis review in relaxing its enforcement of economic substantive due process).
134. While entrenchment differs from discrimination and challengers differ from hippies,
gays, and the mentally retarded, the use of rational-basis review to invalidate statutes has often
occurred when the Court has believed that government decisions were enacted out of improper
motives designed to disadvantage a particular group. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996) (using rational-basis review to invalidate a state constitutional amendment that
prohibited any state or local government body from enacting a law that prohibited
discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (using rational-basis review to invalidate
zoning requirement that a group home for the mentally retarded obtain a special permit for
operation); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (using rational-basis review to
invalidate restriction limiting food stamps to households in which all members were related,
observing that "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group [hippies]
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest").
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Further, neither nonjusticiability nor rational-basis review define which
regulations courts should subject to lesser scrutiny. How should a court treat a
regulation affecting money spent on a movie like Bowling for Columbine,135
which examines America’s obsession with guns and violence and was released
immediately before the 2002 midterm elections? How should a court treat
regulations of election-related speech by media outlets, including
endorsements, editorials, and news reports that discuss candidates or ballot
initiatives? Granted, courts engage in less-than-clear categorical line drawing
in classifying other forms of expression that are subject to greater regulation,
such as "commercial speech."136 The vagueness in categorization, however,
diminishes the guidance afforded by the deference approach.
B. Invalidation of All Reforms
On the other end of the spectrum, a doctrinal test that requires
invalidation of all reforms would provide greater guidance than does the
Absolute invalidation prevents
existing overbreadth doctrine.137
entrenchment-minded legislators from skewing campaign finance regulations
in order to retain their power. It would allow individuals to engage freely in
political activity without fear of unintentionally violating obscure campaign
regulations and facing criminal penalties. Unlike absolute deference to
campaign reforms, invalidation would not pose significant boundary problems.
Courts would strike down the electioneering provisions, the remainder of the
Act, and other campaign reforms along with other regulations of political
speech.
Just as judicial deference overlooks democratic values, absolute
invalidation also ignores important values. The Court has reasoned that large
contributions and spending by corporations and unions pose the twin dangers
of corruption and the appearance of corruption. Further, undisclosed spending
and contributions might also allow for corruption and the appearance of
corruption.138 As explained in detail in Part V, corruption prevents democratic
135. BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (United Artists 2002).
136. See Schauer & Pildes, supra note 126, at 1828 ("[T]he Supreme Court has relied on a
boundary between commercial advertising and other speech that is no more clear and
impermeable than a putative boundary between electoral speech and other forms of political
speech.").
137. As discussed earlier, the heightened scrutiny applied to campaign reforms is not
"fatal-in-fact" because courts tolerate contribution limitations, disclosure requirements, and
limitations on spending by business corporations, unions, and many nonprofit corporations.
138. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) ("[D]isclosure requirements deter actual
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deliberation, widespread participation, individual autonomy, and electoral
competition. An absolute right of business corporations to contribute and
spend unlimited and undisclosed amounts, for example, results in outcomes
based on covert political auctions rather than deliberation. It also minimizes
the influence of citizens over the political process and reduces the incentives
of many individuals to participate in democracy.
In summary, both judicial invalidation and judicial deference provide
guidance to judges while compromising other substantive democratic values.
To many, mutually exclusive binary choices, whether they involve judicial
invalidation or complete deference, seem overly simplistic and incomplete. To
these individuals, a well-functioning, participatory democracy does not exist at
either extreme but instead exists somewhere along the continuum between the
two poles.
C. Content-Based Rules
The Court could provide guidance and avoid the extremes described
above by adopting a bright-line rule that limits regulation to spending on
political expression that contains specific words or references. In his separate
dissent in McConnell, for example, Justice Thomas interpreted Buckley to
require that "any regulation of political speech beyond communications using
words of express advocacy is unconstitutional."139 In applying an express
advocacy rule, the Court would almost certainly find the electioneering
provisions unconstitutional because they regulate spending on speech that does
not contain express advocacy.
Just as the one-person, one-vote rule provided greater guidance in the
districting context,140 the express advocacy rule gives more direction than the
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and
expenditures to the light of publicity.").
139. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 737 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the express
advocacy test was adopted not merely to enhance the clarity of statutory language regulating
independent expenditures, but to narrow its coverage, and asserting that six of the seven circuits
that have considered the question have interpreted express advocacy as a constitutional rule).
Even aside from the broad scope of the electioneering provisions, Justice Thomas stated that,
unlike the other eight Justices, he would invalidate the disclosure requirements of the
electioneering provisions. He asserted that the interest in "providing ‘information’ about the
speaker to the public" does not outweigh the right to anonymous speech. McConnell, 124 S. Ct.
at 736 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962) ("Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that
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conventional overbreadth doctrine. In the words of Justice Thomas, "speech
containing the ‘magic words’ is ‘unambiguously campaign related,’ . . . while
speech without these words is not."141 The rule clearly notifies legislators of
their regulatory authority, which increases the likelihood that reforms will
meet constitutional requirements. The ease in administration streamlines
judicial decisionmaking and reduces concerns that judges will decide cases
based on personal political assumptions.
Granted, the express advocacy rule might require difficult judgments
regarding whether the advocate uses words that are synonymous with "vote
for" or "defeat" in particular contexts; thus, the rule is less mechanical than the
one-person, one-vote rule.142 Nevertheless, by focusing only on magic words,
courts avoid thorny empirical questions that characterize the conventional
overbreadth doctrine—such as the projected number of regulated activities that
will not corrupt or appear to corrupt the political process. The rule also allows
for a consistent protection of speech and regulation of the most blatant
attempts to influence and corrupt the political process.143
The express advocacy rule, however, sacrifices key governmental
interests related to preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.144
a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action."); see also ELY,
supra note 120, at 124 (explaining that the Court adopted a one-person, one-vote rule "precisely
because of considerations of administrability"); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (2d ed., rev. vol. 2002)
(suggesting that "the one-person, one-vote rule based on strict population equality could be
readily managed by the courts and thus allowed a justiciable standard for judicial immersion
into the ‘political thicket’ of elected institutions") (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
732 (1983)).
141. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 739 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
142. See Edward B. Foley, "Smith for Congress" and its Equivalents: An Enforcement
Test under Buckley and MCFL, 2 ELECTION L. J. 3 (discussing different interpretations of the
"express advocacy" standard, and arguing for an interpretation that is fairly clear-cut and
supportive of regulation); Glenn J. Moramarco, Magic Words and the Myth of Certainty, 1
ELECTION L. J. 387, 398 (2002) (discussing the "practical difficulties that arise when one tries to
determine whether particular words, phrases, or images meet the Buckley and MCFL tests for
express advocacy").
143. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 740 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas states:
Buckley did not draw [the express advocacy] line solely to aid in combating real or
apparent corruption, but rather also to ensure the protection of speech unrelated to
election campaigns . . . . [A]s "the distinction between discussion of issues and
candidates . . . may often dissolve in practical application," . . . the only way to
prevent the unjustified burdening of nonelection speech is to impose the regulation
only on speech that is "unambiguously campaign related," . . . i.e., speech using
words of express advocacy.
Id.
144. The rule might also be said to sacrifice values related to informed political decisions
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There is no good reason to believe that express words of advocacy like "vote
for" or "vote against" always or even usually threaten these state interests more
than communications that do not contain such words.145 Campaign
advertisements without "express advocacy," for example, are often more
politically effective, as evidenced by the fact that only 10.4% of all candidatesponsored advertisements that aired during the 2000 federal election cycle
used express advocacy.146 By erring so heavily away from statutes that are
overinclusive, the judicial rule effectively mandates underinclusiveness by
prohibiting legislatures from responding to activity that poses a threat of
corruption but does not include express advocacy. It provides a safe harbor for
corruption and thus encourages shrewd and calculating political actors to
engage in such activity.147 The state’s interests that are sacrificed by the
express advocacy rule cannot be minimized by a more measured interpretation
of the test due to the rigidity of the rule.
Some might propose that the Court restore prevention-of-corruption
values by expanding the boundaries of the judicial tool past express advocacy
to tolerate regulation of spending on any speech that refers to a federal
candidate. Absent any additional tools to determine overbreadth, this broader
judicial tool sacrifices values related to the protection of speech, such as
prevention of incumbent entrenchment and promotion of individual autonomy.
and the enforcement of campaign finance laws through disclosure of financial support:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" in order to aid
the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office . . . . [Further,]
recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an essential means of
gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations
described above.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68 (quoting H.R. REP NO. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
145. Cf. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL
CORRUPTION 112 (The Brookings Institution, 1995) ("There is . . . no good reason to believe that
connections that are proximate and explicit are any more corrupt than connections that are
indirect and implicit.").
146. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN ET AL., BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE
2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 72, fig. 8-1 (2002) (showing that only 10.4% of all candidatesponsored advertisements that aired during the 2000 federal election cycle used the magic
words), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/programs/download/buyingtime2000/chap
ter8.pdf.; JONATHAN S. KRASNO ET AL., BUYING TIME: TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 9 (2000) (stating that only 4% of all candidate-sponsored
advertisements that aired during the 1998 federal election cycle used the magic words).
147. The rule might also be said to confuse constitutionally prohibitable activity with
constitutionally protected activity, thereby enabling the rationalization of circumvention.
Rather than honestly admitting that only judicial policy protects their activity, political actors
avoid moral culpability by dressing their activity as a "right" protected by the First Amendment.
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Such a rule would presumably tolerate the regulation of money spent on
activities that pose little threat of corruption, such as a 60 Minutes148
newsmagazine interview of a senator or a constituent’s letter to her
representative. Similarly, it prevents legislative attempts to regulate corruptive
spending on speech that does not include a reference to a candidate. An oil
company attempting to curry favor with George W. Bush during the 2000
presidential election, for example, could have run an ad attacking the honesty
of Democrats without ever mentioning the name of Al Gore.149
Content-based boundaries are inadequate because the corrupting potential
of money depends not merely upon what is said. It also depends upon contextspecific factors such as speaker identity, audience, extent of regulation, and
timing—who, where, how, and when.150 The Court’s rulings reflect the
importance of context to a limited extent. For example, prior to McConnell the
Court determined that corporate spending poses a greater threat of corruption
than spending by individuals.151 Along similar lines, disclosure requirements
are less intrusive upon expressive interests than are spending limitations.152
The jurisprudence of the mechanical, content-based, express advocacy
test, however, does not fully incorporate context-specific distinctions and
results in illogical outcomes. For example, a legislature could prohibit
spending on express advocacy by a corporation, but it could not require
disclosure of corporate spending on a slightly different advertisement that
omits express advocacy yet is clearly designed to influence the election and
corrupt the process. This focus on how spending on speech is regulated
exposes the shortcomings of a one-dimensional, content-based construction of
the boundaries of reform. One can make a strong argument that what type of
speech can be regulated should vary depending on how legislators propose to
regulate the money, who is using the money, and when and where the
expressive activity will take place.

148. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast).
149. FEC regulations would likely exclude a party reference from the scope of the
electioneering provisions’ coverage, unless the reference constituted an "unambiguous reference
to [a candidate’s] status as a candidate such as ‘the Democratic presidential nominee.’" 11
C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(2) (2003).
150. Why, or the intent of the speaker to corrupt the process, is relevant but is less useful
due to the difficulty that courts and legislatures face in discerning speaker intent in a
manageable manner that allows for effective regulation.
151. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 682 (1990) (discussing the
substantial risk of corruption posed by the vast wealth of corporations).
152. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (discussing the severe impact of
expenditure limits on protected political speech).
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D. A Multidimensional Rule

In light of the limitations of a content-based judicial rule, the Court might
adopt a rule that accounts for content, form of regulation, speaker identity,
timing, and audience. The electioneering provisions of the Act attempt to do
this statutorily, but the Court could adopt similar guidelines as the boundaries
of reform. Judges might interpret the electioneering provisions as the effective
boundaries of reform, much as plaintiffs and some earlier courts interpreted the
Court’s express advocacy holding in Buckley as the boundary of legislative
authority. Following the Court’s guidance in McConnell, judges might
presume constitutional those state statutes that are identical to the
electioneering provisions. Courts might also invalidate those statutes that are
more restrictive than the electioneering provisions. This de facto judicial test,
however, provides no guidance as to whether other types of reforms
improperly infringe on too much speech. Constitutional questions about low
contribution limits or restrictions on political spending by nonprofit
organizations that receive minimal funds from business corporations, for
example, remain unanswered.
In addition, to the extent that courts emphasize the electioneering
provisions as a fixed boundary for the permissible scope of regulation, they
unjustifiably warp the evolution of legislative responses to corruption.153
Local and state elections differ from federal elections. Democracy
continuously evolves based on legal, technological, and social changes in the
distribution of resources, in campaign methods, and in fundraising practices.
A rigid judicial rule impedes this growth,154 mechanically substituting the
Court’s fixed political judgment for the legislature’s normal function of
reviewing and repairing obsolete statutes.155 Courts only muddy the test by
adding additional rules and exceptions to address context-specific issues.156
153. See Sullivan, supra note 51, at 66 (noting the argument that rules "tend toward
obsolescence" whereas standards "are flexible and permit decisionmakers to adapt them to
changing circumstances over time").
154. Cf. Fallon, supra note 125, at 62 (stating that "in shaping constitutional tests, the
Supreme Court must take account of empirical, predictive, and institutional considerations that
may vary from time to time").
155. See Brief for McConnell Intervenor-Defendants, supra note 29, at 61 (arguing that
"periodic statutory repair is a normal process—and the natural province of legislatures, not of
courts"); cf. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 643–54 (surveying the continuous process of enacting
campaign regulations in response to evolving threats money posed to democratic integrity); id.
at 706 ("We are under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the
matter. Money, like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how
Congress will respond, are concerns for another day.").
156. Cf. Rose, supra note 52, at 578–79 (noting that "over time, the straightforward
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Further, distinctions between those who use statutes and judicial tests
might justify greater flexibility for judicial tests. Clear, rule-like statutes
benefit speakers. Such rules provide instant notice to citizens as to prohibited
and permissible activities. The legislature may periodically craft new brightline rules to respond to evolving campaign strategies, technologies, and
problems. In contrast, judicial tests are intended to provide guidance to
legislatures and judges for reviewing statutes and also to promote consistency
in decisions. Unlike lay speakers, judges and legislatures generally have legal
staff, law libraries, time, and other resources to help them interpret and apply
more sophisticated judicial tests. Granted, judicial review requires judges to
have a clearer understanding of the relevant democratic objectives and values
than that provided by the current overbreadth doctrine. Nevertheless, judicial
tests might become obsolete if crafted as simple, inflexible rules. The
simplicity and inflexibility that characterize an ideal campaign finance statute
might prove detrimental when adopted as characteristics of a judicial tool.
V. Balancing Clearly Defined Values to Review Campaign Reform
In contrast to a judicial rule, a balancing test would allow judges to
consider different values and respond to evolving and context-specific
campaign practices and reforms. This Part proposes, applies, and analyzes a
test that balances four values: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. To fully
appreciate the benefits of balancing values, however, it may be helpful to first
explore the inadequacies of other balancing tests.
One balancing test would define substantial overbreadth by a fixed
percentage of invalid applications of a statute relative to total applications. For
example, a ten percent overbreadth threshold would assume that the harms of
ten invalid applications are sufficiently weighty to offset any gains from ninety
valid applications. Context-specific factors associated with overbreadth,
however, evade quantification by a single fixed number. Different types of
regulations advance the state interest and infringe on expression to varying
degrees. For example, spending prohibitions are perceived to burden
expressive interests more than disclosure requirements. Therefore, a spending
prohibition in which ten percent of the applications were invalid might be
more troubling than a disclosure requirement in which ten percent of the
applications were invalid. Similarly, different applications of any single
common law crystalline rules have been muddied repeatedly by exceptions and equitable
second-guessing").
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statute are often not simply "invalid" or "valid," but advance the state’s interest
and infringe upon expressive values to varying degrees. A numerical
threshold such as ten percent would fail to reflect the true harms and benefits
of a particular statute.
Professor Richard Hasen, observing that numbers alone do not reveal
whether overbreadth is substantial, proposed that courts ultimately weigh "the
benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve" against the "costs of
overbreadth."157 Along similar lines, Justice Breyer has suggested that courts
reviewing campaign finance regulations ask "whether the statute burdens any
one such [constitutionally protected] interest in a manner out of proportion to
the statute’s salutary effects upon the others."158 The flexibility of Hasen’s and
Breyer’s tests would likely allow courts to respond to evolving and contextspecific political activities and regulations.
Although Hasen’s and Breyer’s approaches seem right in principle, they
provide minimal guidance because they inadequately define the benefits and
the costs.159 Judges predisposed against reform will likely see great harm in a
statute that chills even a small number of expressive activities that do not pose
threats of corruption. They may not appreciate the extent to which a statute
advances a vague objective like "the prevention of corruption." Judges

157. Hasen, supra note 45, at 1801. Hasen notes:
[T]he answer to the overbreadth question for regulating sham issue advocacy
depends not only on the percentage of genuine issue advertisements captured but
also on the benefits that the legislation hopes to achieve compared to the costs of
requiring corporations and unions wishing to run genuine issue ads to do so only
through a separate PAC.
Hasen, supra note 72. Hasen’s proposal draws upon that of Professor Richard Fallon, who
suggested that courts applying overbreadth doctrine ultimately balance:
(a) the state’s substantive interest in being able to impose sanctions for a particular
kind of conduct under a particular legal standard, as opposed to being forced to rely
on other, less restrictive substitutes against (b) the First Amendment interest in
encouraging narrow statutes and avoiding as much as possible the chilling of
constitutionally protected conduct.
Fallon, supra note 38, at 894.
158. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring);
see also Jerome Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight From First Amendment Doctrine:
Justice Brewer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817, 821 (1998)
(discussing the merits of Justice Breyer’s balancing approach vis-à-vis First Amendment tests).
159. Indeed, Professor Hasen recognizes the lack of clarity that comes from his proposal,
and notes that his "[e]ssay is not the place to explore all of these questions in detail, which go to
the heart of the debate over modern campaign finance regulation." Hasen, supra note 45, at
1804.
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predisposed in favor of reform will likely have different understandings of the
relevant values, and thus might arrive at an opposite conclusion.160
Perfect solutions that provide mechanical guidance, respect all relevant
democratic values, and allow courts to respond to context-specific factors
might not exist. A balancing test that provides more guidance, however,
would advance these variables more than the alternatives. One way to enhance
guidance would be to further develop the specific values that campaign
activities and regulations should promote. For example, although the Court
has accepted prevention of corruption as a compelling state interest, it has
failed to clearly develop the values promoted by this interest.161 Similarly, the
Court has not fully articulated the democratic values that judicial protection of
the use of money to support political candidates is intended to promote.
Without a concrete understanding of such values, judges are likely to
justify their conclusions using abstract terms like "free speech" or "prevention
of corruption" without a meaningful explanation as to when these concepts
should be limited. By fleshing out relevant values and painting a more
coherent vision of democracy, the Court would provide additional guidance to
lower courts, to legislatures, and to itself in future cases.162
This Part elaborates upon four democratic values inherent in the Justices’
approaches to campaign finance cases: democratic deliberation, widespread
participation, individual autonomy, and electoral competition. A court would
invalidate a campaign reform that, on the whole, detracts from these values
more than it advances them. Granted, even with such a test, political
assumptions may influence judicial decisionmaking. As discussed in further
detail below, greater transparency in the accounting of the political values at
stake allows for a more coherent doctrine than that afforded by a conventional
overbreadth approach, and more flexibility than bright-line judicial rules.
160. The conflicting opinions in McConnell illustrate the indeterminacy of such balancing.
The Stevens/O’Connor majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent both avoided a discussion on
the precise proportion of protected activities that would be covered by the electioneering
provisions. Instead, the Stevens/O’Connor opinion seemed to conclude that the benefits of
restricting corporate and union spending to influence political campaigns outweighed the costs
of restricting speech unrelated to campaigns. The Kennedy dissent came to the opposite
conclusion.
161. See Frank J. Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court and
Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 103 (1986) (observing that although the phrase
prevention of corruption "has a ring that most Americans will like . . . its apparent clarity is
deceptive, and its origin is at best clouded").
162. See Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A
Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 796 (2000) (arguing that "an
emphasis on principles . . . might bring some sense and could help foster some predictability" to
election law).
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A. Four Democratic Values

Campaign regulation and expressive activities implicate four democratic
values: democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual
autonomy, and electoral competition. As evidenced below, different Justices
have alluded to these values in both supporting and opposing campaign
regulation. This Subpart culls the values from the Justices’ opinions in
McConnell and other campaign finance cases and more clearly articulates
them. Individuals will likely dispute the primacy of these four values. Some
might favor alternative values; others might note that aspects of the values
overlap,163 or they might describe or categorize the values differently.164
Whatever one thinks of these specific values suggested by the Justices, the
central objective is to illustrate that a more explicit acknowledgment and
detailed articulation of democratic values will allow for greater understanding
and coherence of campaign finance doctrine.
1. Democratic Deliberation
The state’s interest in preventing corruption is intended, in part, to
promote democratic deliberation. The Court’s discussions of prevention of
corruption presume the existence of a deliberative norm from which
officeholders may stray.165 Corruption, according to the Court, consists not
just of "quid pro quo agreements," but also of "undue influence on an
officeholder’s judgment"166 or the threat of "politicians too compliant with the

163. The values intersect in many different ways. For example, widespread participation
provides diverse perspectives that allow enhanced democratic deliberation. Participation is
most effective in competitive races when vulnerable candidates must respond to citizens.
Participation and individual autonomy are both justified, in part, on the grounds of citizen selffulfillment.
164. The values are not presented in the form of a conventional Republican, Pluralist, or
Descriptive theory of democracy, although elements of all three can be found in considering the
values.
165. See, e.g., Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 127, 128 (1997) ("In order to employ the concept of corruption . . . one must
have some underlying notion of the pure, original or natural state of the body politic."); cf.
Joseph S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, in POLITICAL
CORRUPTION 963, 966 (Heidenheimer et al. eds., 1989) (defining corruption as "behavior which
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close
family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain
types of private-regarding influence").
166. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441 (2001).
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wishes of large contributors."167 In McConnell, the Stevens/O’Connor
majority opinion expressed concern that large contributions would prevent
officeholders would prevent officeholders from deciding issues "on the
merits."168
The Court has also acknowledged a deliberative norm among the
citizenry. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,169 the Court defined
corruption as the use of immense wealth acquired through state-created
advantages to distort political debate to such a degree that it does not reflect
the public’s support for ideas.170 In another example, the Court acknowledged
that disclosure requirements provide "the electorate with information ‘as to
where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal
office."171
Spending on speech may also be said to facilitate deliberation. In striking
down spending restrictions, the Court in Buckley reasoned that a "restriction on
the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached."172 The Kennedy dissent in McConnell called for
invalidation of the provisions restricting electioneering spending by
corporations, unions, and many nonprofits because of the "dynamic
contribution diverse groups and associations make to the intellectual and
cultural life of the Nation."173 Justice Thomas would invalidate contribution
limits because they infringe upon "the distinct role of candidate organizations
as a means of individual participation in the Nation’s civic dialogue."174
167. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000). While the Court in
McConnell recognized that the interest in preventing corruption extends past "cash-for-votes
corruption to curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of
such influence,’" it also noted that "mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone
is insufficient to justify regulation." McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 664, 666.
168. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 666.
169. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
170. See id. at 660 ("Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed
in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of political
contributions."); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957) (observing that the objective
of the prohibition on corporate political contributions "was not merely to prevent the subversion
of the integrity of the electoral process" but also "to sustain the active, alert responsibility of the
individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government").
171. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976).
172. Id. at 19.
173. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 417 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also James Madison, Report on
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Despite conflicting assumptions about the role of regulation in advancing
democratic deliberation, the Justices have not fleshed out the meaning of
deliberation. "Deliberative politics connotes an argumentative interchange
among persons who recognize each other as equal in authority and entitlement
to respect . . . ."175 Deliberation does not simply allow for the discovery of
pre-existing valid results, but allows for results that citizens consider valid due
to the legitimacy of the deliberative process.176 A variety of tools facilitate
deliberation, including but not limited to legislative hearings, letters to
newspaper editors, campaign materials, and town hall meetings.177
Although most people are never completely removed from their own
interests and experiences,178 deliberative democracy aspires to focus on reason
and argument rather than on strategic bargaining or coercion in collective
decisionmaking.179 The failure to consider a wide, representative range of
the Resolutions (1799–1800), in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 397 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)
(noting that democracy depends on the freedom of "examining and discussing [the] merits and
demerits of the candidates").
175. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989).
176. Cf. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 167 (1984) ("[W]here politics is the preeminent domain of things public (res publica),
political knowledge is communal and consensual rather than either subjective (the product of
private senses or of private reason) or objective (existing independently of individual wills).");
JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 121–23 (1920) (illustrating a change in science
from valuing theoretical knowledge to experimental knowledge as an example of the process
defining the result); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 170–71 (1979)
(observing that "[i]f we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and social practice, rather
than as an attempt to mirror nature," we develop a philosophy separated from the quest for
certainty); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619,
2634 (1995) (describing that private adjudicative disputes achieve validity because they
exemplify the application of the law, which is a visible residue of public action); Bernard
Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 POL. THEORY 338, 351–52 (Elly Stein &
Jane Mansbridge trans., 1987) (arguing that "the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined
will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself").
177. Other examples include citizen and expert testimony, committee reports, public
statements, campaigning, exchanges with lobbyists and constituents, petition signing, Weblogs,
Websites, letters to government officials, membership in political parties or public interest
groups, handbills, leaflets, speeches, debates, news appearances, and television and radio
advertisements.
178. See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense
of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1449 (1997) (asserting
that "people never stand completely outside their personalities, class backgrounds, levels of
education, and so on").
179. See Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 325, 331 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1944) ("The prudence and temperance of your discussions will promote, within your own walls,
that conciliation which so much befriends rational conclusion; and by its example will
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views sacrifices deliberation.180 This might occur when one uses contributions
or spending to coerce a government official into making a decision. It might
also occur when a disproportionately larger percentage of an elected official’s
time is spent with wealthier financial supporters than with those who have
Business corporations can contribute important
fewer resources.181
information toward deliberation. The charters of many corporations, however,
limit the objectives of such entities to making money for the shareholders.
While this goal may sometimes overlap with the common good, the objectives
are not coterminous.
2. Widespread Participation
The Court has suggested that the prevention of an appearance of
corruption preserves citizen participation. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, for example, the Court stated that preventing the appearance
of corruption was important because "the cynical assumption that large donors
call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance."182 In McConnell, the Court stated that contribution
encourage among our constituents that progress of opinion which is tending to unite them in
object and in will."); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 110 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1975) (examining the effects of using practical deliberation rather than force); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, at 80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he causes of faction cannot be
removed and . . . relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects."); Michelman,
supra note 175, at 293 (describing that the "deliberative medium is a good faith exchange of
views . . . in which all participants remain open to the possibility of persuasion by others"); Cass
R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1544 (1988) ("Under
republican approaches to politics, laws must be supported by argument and reasons; they cannot
simply be fought for or be the product of self-interested ‘deals.’").
180. Cf. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877, 881 (1963) (listing one of the values of speech as "attainment of truth" acquired "by
considering all facts and arguments which can be put forth in behalf of or against any
proposition"). Widespread participation and honest consideration of different perspectives is
especially important to democratic deliberation in light of criticisms that an overemphasis on
"reasoning" favors educated elites and an aspiration of a single "common good" ignores the
diversity of society.
181. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1283 (1994) ("If the candidate is not substantially free . . . to spend her time
considering . . . the grievances, information, and ideas of non-donors . . . the process falls short,
not just of the ideal but of the constitutional norm.").
182. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000); see id. at 401 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (writing that campaign finance restrictions seek to "build public confidence in [the
democratic] process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful financial support,
encouraging the public participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
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limits "require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a
greater number of persons" and "tangibly benefit public participation in
political debate."183
On the other hand, complex campaign regulations of grassroots activity
might hinder widespread participation. For example, the Court has
acknowledged that disclosure requirements of contributions as low as ten
dollars "may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political
process."184 In a similar vein, Justice Thomas has stated that contribution
restrictions relegate individuals’ attempts to participate to less effective and
less convenient methods.185
Scholars have defined citizen participation as "purposeful activities in
which citizens take part in relation to government."186 Participation is a crucial
democratic value. As Justice Brandeis remarked, "the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people."187 Participation includes, but is not limited to
voting;188 involvement or financial support of a campaign, political party,

presupposes") (citing A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
24–27 (1948)); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (finding that the
interests of preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption "directly
implicate ‘the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual
citizen for the successful functioning of that process’").
183. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at. at 656; see also Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002) (observing that campaign finance laws seek to
"democratize the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby
building public confidence in that process, broadening the base of a candidate’s meaningful
financial support, and encouraging greater public participation").
184. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 83 (1976).
185. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 417–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that restrictions result
in the "suppression of political speech" and "relegate donors’ points of view to less effective
modes of communication").
186. Stuart Langton, What is Citizen Participation?, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA
13, 17 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978). See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970) (presenting essays on the nature and value of public participation
in the democratic process); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (C. George Benello &
Dimitrios Roussopoulos eds., 1971) (same); PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NOMOS XVI (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1975) (same).
187. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
188. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
31 (1985) (asserting that the early Republican conception of political participation included
deliberative dialogue and debate, and was not limited simply to the act of voting). But see John
H. Aldrich, Rational Choice and Turnout, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 246, 246 (1993) (stating that
"turning out to vote is the most common and important act of political participation in any
democracy").
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issue, or interest group; public advocacy and protest; and absorbing news
about public affairs.189
Widespread participation serves four primary functions. First, it exposes
decision-makers to a variety of ideas and viewpoints, which ensures fully
informed decisions.190 Second, it enhances the legitimacy of government
decisions, which increases the likelihood that citizens will voluntarily comply
with such decisions.191 Third, widespread participation allows for a
redistribution of government resources and priorities to reflect evolving
problems and needs.192 Finally, participation furthers self-fulfillment and selfdefinition of individual citizens who play a role in shaping the decisions that
impact their lives.193 These functions suggest that as many natural persons as
possible, or at least as many citizens as possible, should have access to the
instrumentalities of participation. While corporate participation might expose
decision-makers to additional ideas and viewpoints, self-fulfillment and other
functions of participation seem uniquely applicable to natural persons.
To the extent that vast disparities exist in the instrumentalities of
participation, citizens might feel less able to shape the decisions that impact

189. See JAMES BURKHART ET AL., STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 41 (1972)
(providing examples of participation in information gathering and opinion forming); MARY
GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC
SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY APPROACH 54–60 (1981) (providing examples of citizen
participation); Langton, supra note 186, at 21–23 (same).
190. See Walter A. Rosenbaum, Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual: The
Development of Federal Participation Programs, in CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 81, 87
(Stuart Langton ed., 1978) ("Many commentators favor public involvement because it can
reduce administrative freedom to make decisions from narrowly professional bureaucratic of
self-interested motivations."); Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental
Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 267–68 (1999) ("Widespread participation exposes decisionmakers to
a healthy mix of perspectives, which is believed to improve the decisionmaking process.").
191. See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 189, at 132 (presenting the hypothesis that "[t]he
more satisfied the citizens are with participation, the more trusting and efficacious they will
be"); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Emptiness of Majority Rule, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 201
(1996) ("To deserve the democratic denomination, the people must take part in political
affairs.").
192. See KWEIT & KWEIT, supra note 189, at 162 (asserting that the goals of public
participation include the redistribution of power).
193. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989) (discussing a "constitutive" vision of
politics whereby citizens define themselves through their participation); see also C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 47–48, 51–52 (1977) (asserting that
public participation increases "the amount of personal self-development of all the members of
society").
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their lives and may question the legitimacy of the laws.194 Formal equality of
some instrumentalities of participation, such as voting, is appropriate.
Uniform equality of other instrumentalities, however, is sometimes
inconsistent with widespread participation.195 Precise equality fails to
appreciate that excessive restrictions can deaden political participation to the
detriment of society as a whole. For example, a complete prohibition on the
use of private funds for political purposes would outlaw even the purchase of a
poster board to make a sign criticizing the government. By tying the use of
instrumentalities of participation to fixed and inflexible principles, mechanical
equality aspires to a mathematical certainty that is inconsistent with fair and
practical implementation in many areas other than voting. The democratic
value of widespread participation is not synonymous with dull uniformity.
3. Individual Autonomy
Individual autonomy is an important principle generally undergirding
expression. In emphasizing a form of individual autonomy that stems from
freedom from government restriction, Justice Thomas wrote:
Even if contributions to a candidate were not the most effective means of
speaking . . . an individual’s choice of that mode of expression would still
be protected . . . . Buckley completely failed in its attempt to provide a
basis for permitting government to second-guess the individual choices of
citizens partaking in quintessentially democratic activities . . . . [T]he right
to free speech is a right held by each American, not by Americans en
masse.196

194. According to James A. Gardner:
Generally, participation is most meaningful when it is a means by which citizens
can play a significant role in shaping the decisions that affect their lives. For this
condition to hold, citizens must feel that there is some reasonable prospect for their
participation to lead eventually to actions that affect them.
James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility of Political Community, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 1237, 1247 (2002) (footnote omitted).
195. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 198 (2000) (distinguishing between
equality of deliberation, or "influence," and decisionmaking, and arguing that "equality of
influence is incompatible, even in principle, with other attractive aspects of an egalitarian
society"); Andrei Marmor, Authority, Equality and Democracy 18 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cleo/working-papers/olin/documents/03_15_paper.pdf)
(asserting that "a principle of equality need not be the same kind of equality with respect to
these two main stages of the political process, namely, deliberation and decision").
196. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 417 n.5, 418, 420 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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On the other hand, campaign regulation that prevents corruption has been
described as implicating "the responsibility of the individual citizen for the
successful functioning" of the electoral process.197 A contested concept with
multiple meanings, individual autonomy requires further development to be
useful in the campaign finance context.198
Perhaps the most familiar concept of individual autonomy stems from an
individual’s freedom from government interference in doing or determining
what she wants.199 To achieve self-realization, the mind must be free. Selfexpression is perceived as an "integral part of the development of ideas, of
mental exploration, and of the affirmation of self."200 Government suppression
of such thoughts is an affront to one’s individual dignity.201
Individual autonomy involves choice—"a right [of individuals] to make
important decisions defining their own lives for themselves."202 Autonomy
means "having a say in what affects you," including how one is governed.203
197. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957).
198. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876
(1994) ("Autonomy, however, is a protean concept, which means different things to different
people, and occasionally appears to change its meaning in the course of a single argument.")
(footnote omitted).
199. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122–
31 (1969) (describing the notion of negative freedom).
200. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5
(1967); see MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11 (1984)
("[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value, . . .
‘individual self-realization.’").
201. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) ("For the
achievement of this self-realization the mind must be free. Hence suppression of belief,
opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man’s essential
nature."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 787 (2d ed. 1988)
(explaining that "much of our commitment to freedom of speech" stems from the belief that
"political participation is valuable in part because it enhances personal growth and selfrealization"). But see OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 83 (1996) (noting that "[t]he
autonomy protected by the First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by individuals and the press is
not an end in itself, as it might be in some moral code, but is rather a means to further the
democratic values underlying the Bill of Rights").
202. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 222 (1993); see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY
AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 138 (1995) (noting that autonomy can be defined as
permitting or empowering individuals to be "authors of the narratives of their own lives").
203. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 75 (1989) (defining individual autonomy as "the
importance of each individual having a say in how he or she is governed"); Michael H. Shapiro,
Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1567 n.48
(1988) ("‘Autonomy,’ as used in the text, refers to that aspect of autonomy dealing with
opportunities to pursue preferences—an ability generally enhanced by having a say in what
affects you.").
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The extent to which a person exercises this choice, however, does not depend
upon mere government action or inaction. Other variables are relevant,
including one’s personal talents, access to resources, and the actions of other
nongovernmental actors. Autonomy also requires "freedom from coercion,
manipulation, and temporary distortion of judgment,"204 and the existence of
meaningful alternatives from which to choose.205 Government activity or
restriction—such funding that enables additional choices or restrictions on
coercive behavior—can therefore enhance the autonomy of a particular
individual.
Any action to expand autonomy by government or other entities,
however, requires judgments about resources, coercion, and options that are
external to the individual. Such judgments can be said to paternalistically
compromise a person’s autonomy by attributing her successes and failures to
factors external to herself.206 Others, however, see this paternalism argument
as rhetoric designed to preserve the status quo and prevent widespread access
to substantive autonomy. It seems possible to consider the substantive,
relative aspects of autonomy as long as they do not overshadow the intimate,
personal, self-determinative nature of the concept. A significant difference
exists, for example, between a sixty-day restriction on corporate spending on
broadcast ads and a government requirement that the government itself own
and program all media outlets. In light of the self-realization values
undergirding autonomy, the concept seems uniquely applicable to natural
persons. Restrictions on corporations, however, might diminish the autonomy
of potential listeners by eliminating the option to hear corporate-sponsored
speech.207
4. Electoral Competition

204. Fallon, supra note 198, at 877.
205. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373–77 (1986) (explaining that without
an adequate range of options, one does not enjoy an autonomous life).
206. Cf. Fallon, supra note 198, at 878 ("Employed as an ascriptive concept, autonomy
represents the purported metaphysical foundation of people’s capacity and also their right to
make and act on their own decisions, even if those decisions are ill-considered or substantively
unwise.").
207. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (invalidating restrictions on
corporate spending on ballot measures, asserting that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual").
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Many Justices on the Court have expressed concern that incumbent
politicians will design reforms to keep themselves in power and disadvantage
challengers.208 In the words of Justice Scalia, "[t]he incumbent politician who
says he welcomes full and fair debate is no more to be believed than the
entrenched monopolist who says he welcomes full and fair competition."209 In
contrast, reformers have argued that the ability of the wealthy to contribute and
spend large sums on behalf of incumbent lawmakers undermines the
competitiveness of elections and ensures that government officials are not
responsive to the concerns of most Americans.210
Electoral competition means that insurgents challenge incumbents,
candidates actively pursue voter support, incumbents face a real possibility of

208. The dissenting opinions in McConnell expressed concerns about the entrenching
effects of the Act. See McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 721 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[A]ny restriction upon a type of campaign speech that is equally available to challengers
and incumbents tends to favor incumbents."); id. at 753–54 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a
general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds.").
Indeed, the Stevens/O’Connor opinion in McConnell was too quick to dismiss dangers that
lawmakers passed the Act to preserve their own political power. The Stevens/O’Connor
majority opinion addressed this issue with two sentences:
Any concern that Congress might opportunistically pass campaign-finance
regulation for self-serving ends is taken into account by the applicable level of
scrutiny. Congress must show concrete evidence that a particular type of financial
transaction is corrupting or gives rise to the appearance of corruption and that the
chosen means of regulation are closely drawn to address that real or apparent
corruption.
Id. at 684 n.72.
The Court’s application of a generic "closely drawn to prevent corruption" test, however,
does not take into account the threat of incumbent entrenchment. Lawmakers may craft a
regulation, for example, that both prevents corruption and entrenches incumbents. Recognizing
that a primary purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent elected officials from enacting laws
that prevent criticism of government, the Court in McConnell should have provided a more
meaningful discussion of the competing dangers of entrenchment and corruption.
209. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 692 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e should not defer in respect to whether its solution, by imposing too low a
contribution limit, significantly increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of
incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge."); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 644 n.9 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that judicial deference to campaign reforms
"amounts to letting the fox stand watch over the henhouse").
210. See Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 4, at 301 ("The systemic degradation of the
political influence of the nonaffluent is best witnessed by government policy. Congress is far
more responsive to the political interests of the wealthy than the poor, and often acts to the
detriment of those who do not participate in the wealth primary.").
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losing, and voters have meaningful choices.211 The electorate can "only
express a ‘free and uncorrupted choice’ if it has the ability to select among
competing political prospects."212 The primary purpose of electoral
competition is to produce government officials and policy outcomes that are
responsive to the interests of citizens.213 Absent competition, elected officials
lack incentives to respond to evolving problems and opportunities.214
Competition puts a check on the power of government officials who might
otherwise enact or tolerate abusive practices.215 This accountability to the
electorate ensures democratic legitimacy.216
When incumbent responsiveness to the needs of a majority of constituents
creates a lack of competition, little cause for concern exists. The process
malfunctions, however, when incumbents diminish competition not by
responding to a majority of the electorate, but by using the power of office to
manipulate campaign rules or to acquire other special advantages over
211. See Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1212 (2002) (describing the problem of
inadequate funding for challengers who face well-funded incumbents and its negative effects on
informed voter decisionmaking); Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional
Constraints on Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2190 (2001) (defining electoral
competitiveness as, at a minimum, "the ability of elections to present contests to the voters in
which the winners are not predetermined"). Electoral competitiveness is distinct from the
competitive marketplace of ideas metaphor used to justify judicial protection of speech from
regulation. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .").
212. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
615 (2002).
213. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 118, at 646 ("Only through an appropriately
competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be realized:
that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and views of
citizens.").
214. See Issacharoff, supra note 212, at 600 ("Viewed differently, however, this form of
political market manipulation threatens a core tenet of democratic legitimacy: accountability to
shifting voter preferences.").
215. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("A
dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul [sic] on the government . . . .").
216. See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 205–07 (1989)
(identifying responsiveness "as the core of a theory of legitimacy"); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 232 (1967) (arguing that a "representative government must
not merely be in control, not merely promote the public interest, but must also be responsive to
the people"). Note that some defend anticompetitive practices as furthering democratic stability
and avoiding factionalism. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (upholding
various California restrictions on ballot access due to a state interest in political stability, and
stating that "California apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered parties and
unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government").

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN REFORM

719

challengers.217 While reforms could in principle enhance competition, in
reality incumbents aspire to preserve their power. Therefore, a court should
aspire to ensure that reforms do not, on the whole, diminish competition.
B. Institutions and Empirical Inquiries
Even if the Court adopted the four democratic values, thorny empirical
issues remain. This Subpart identifies fact-finding challenges unique to
judicial review of campaign finance regulations. It also proposes an
evidentiary standard and lists some types of evidence that courts should
consider when reviewing campaign reforms.
Judicial speculation about political effects differs from the traditional
judicial fact-finding role. In most cases, judges feel comfortable with their
ability to predict the effects of activities and statutes. In the campaign finance
context, unanticipated political consequences abound and judges face
difficulties in predicting the extent to which reforms like the electioneering
provisions will further state interests.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, campaign finance determinations
differ from more ascertainable questions, such as "was the defendant at the
scene of the crime?"218 For example, how does a defendant establish that
money unduly influenced deliberations on a large number of bills?219 This
question has no definitive answer. Relevant variables include the merits of
each bill, alternative proposals, and the influence of monetary factors relative
to nonmonetary factors in the passage of each bill. No static, controlled set of
variables exists that allows the isolation and mathematical determination of the

217. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem,
85 GEO. L.J. 491, 498 (1997) (describing legislative entrenchment and stating that "the desire of
representatives to perpetuate their hold on office may induce them to act contrary to the
preferences of their constituents on a variety of issues"); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of
Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611 (1999) ("Democratic systems are subject to
certain characteristic manipulations; we seek to identify those dangers and suggest the need for
some external institution or legal rule structures to counteract these tendencies.").
218. See Sorauf, supra note 161, at 110 (explaining the problems of definition and prooffacing determinations of "improper" or "excessive" influence within campaigns).
219. Similar problems confront fact-finding related to other values. For example, how can
a plaintiff establish conclusively that the electioneering provisions, if implemented, will dampen
competition by advantaging incumbents and disadvantaging challengers? How can a defendant
show definitively that more citizens will participate in politics once the electioneering
provisions are enacted?

720

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 663 (2004)

influence of one causal factor like corporate and union spending on
electioneering ads.220
Courts should not invalidate reforms simply because defendants cannot
establish their effects with absolute certainty. This indefiniteness might stem
from the practical difficulty in obtaining definitive answers to questions of a
political nature rather than from a lack of justification for the reform. If courts
are to engage in meaningful review rather than mechanical invalidation of
reforms, the inability to measure political effects with mathematical precision
cannot, by itself, jeopardize the regulation.
The unique nature of campaign finance fact-finding raises the question of
whether judges should defer to the legislative record in the campaign finance
context.221 Judges traditionally consider cases involving individual harms, and
they might possess expertise in assessing facts regarding individual autonomy.
Legislators, however, seem best positioned to assess the effects of money and
regulations upon deliberation. Due to their experience as candidates,
legislators also possess the most expertise to determine the effects of money
and campaign regulations on widespread participation and electoral
competition.
Complete judicial deference to legislative fact-finding regarding any
single value would hamper judicial review. Simply by beefing up the
legislative record with findings that a regulation enhances deliberation,
participation, autonomy, and competition, Congress could enact laws
effectively immune from judicial review.222 Incumbents’ incentives to pass
reforms that insulate themselves from challengers make this especially
problematic.223
220. A fact finder, one might argue, could engage in a comparative analysis of the thought
process of every legislator regarding every piece of legislation considered, and enter into a
complex "but for" analysis about which bills would have passed. Even in the unlikely event
that one could practically engage in such a survey, the Speech and Debate Clause of the
Constitution might prohibit members from being questioned about the motivations for their
legislative acts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House,
[Members of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place."); see also Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969) (stating that the Speech and Debate Clause ensures "that
legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents without fear that they will be
later called to task in the courts for that representation").
221. Cf. Richardson, supra note 107, at 31 (examining the problems inherent in judicial
review of speech prohibition laws).
222. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(asserting that "the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essential
to its validity").
223. See ELY, supra note 120, at 106 (noting that incumbents, as "ins[,] have a way of
wanting to make sure that outs stay out"); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN REFORM

721

The doctrine provides few answers to fact-finding problems. While the
Court requires an evidentiary showing of corruption to justify campaign
restrictions,224 its standards are unclear. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, the Court stated that "[w]e have never accepted mere
conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden"225 but that "[t]he
quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility
of the justification raised."226 The method by which a court determines
novelty or plausibility remains unclear.
The Court might adopt an alternative evidentiary standard that responds
to institutional competencies and incentives. Such a test would create a
rebuttable presumption that reforms entrench incumbents and infringe upon
individual autonomy. To rebut that presumption, the defendants could
produce evidence showing that reform benefits incumbents no more than it
does challengers227 and that it refrains from infringing upon individual
autonomy. In the alternative, the defendants may rebut the presumption by
Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 961 (1995) ("Rent-seeking incumbents unfettered by
term limits might stand united on one principle: suppress information or controversy that might
lead voters to drive them from office."); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) ("Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, [the founders] amended
the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.") (quoting Whitney,
274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring)); Klarman, supra note 217, at 498 (describing the
phenomenon of a temporary political majority attempting to "extend its hold on power into the
future, when its members may no longer enjoy majority status" as "the problem of ‘crosstemporal majorities’").
224. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617–18 (1996)
(describing the required evidentiary showing).
[T]he lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the
expenditure . . . prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the
contrary, that a limitation on political parties’ independent expenditures is
necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral system. The
Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings suggesting
any special corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures.
Id.
225. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000).
226. Id. at 391. In Nixon, the Court required only an affidavit from a legislator and the
passage of a campaign finance ballot initiative to establish corruption sufficient to warrant
contribution limits, and some have suggested that the evidentiary standard is effectively lower.
See D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Political Parties, and the First
Amendment: Lessons From Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1105 (2002) (asserting that since
Buckley, the state’s burden of production in establishing the need for contribution limits has
diminished).
227. The term "incumbents" may be used to refer to either incumbent individual
government officials or an incumbent majority party within a legislature.
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showing that the overall gains in deliberation and participation outweigh any
small losses in competition and autonomy. If the defendant successfully
rebuts this initial presumption, the burden of producing additional evidence
about the negative impact of the regulation on any of the four values shifts to
the plaintiff. The more compelling the defendant’s evidence, the more
evidence the plaintiff must present to meet her burden successfully. The
ultimate burden of persuasion, however, would remain with the defendant at
all times.
To meet their burdens, the parties could introduce testimony and studies
by political scientists, public interest groups, and other circumstantial
evidence.228 Information about the jurisdiction that campaign reform covers
would be most relevant, although parties could draw inferences from the
effects of regulations and unregulated activity in other jurisdictions. Numbers
of people and percentages of the population helped or harmed by the
regulation—as well as the frequency with which the regulation impacts these
individuals, the probability that they would be affected, and to what extent
they would be affected—would be relevant but not dispositive. In addition to
testimony and studies presented by the parties, the judge should examine the
adequacy of the legislature’s investigation of the facts.229 The judge should
consider any factors that have arisen since the legislative investigation that
might impact the extent to which the regulation advances or detracts from the
values.230
C. The Least Imperfect Solution

228. Similarly, expert reports, surveys, and polls should not be disqualified due to hearsay
and other evidentiary rules. The purpose of the fact-finding tools, which legislatures often use
to deal with these very types of questions, is to make fact finding by a judge more manageable.
Few judges desire to hear direct testimony from thousands of random citizens in order to reach a
conclusion regarding the citizens’ perception of money in politics. The technical challenges
that result from the political nature of the facts should not be held against the parties.
229. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 107, at 37 (discussing Whiting v. California, 279
U.S. 357 (1927), in which the Court accepted the California legislature’s determination that a
law criminalizing communist activity was necessary to public peace). Unfortunately, ballot
initiatives, which may allow for the most effective reform because self-interested legislators do
not enact them, would lack a legislative record. See David Schultz, Proving Political
Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws,
18 REV. LITIG. 85, 113 (1999) (stating that courts invalidated political contribution and
expenditure limits passed by ballot initiative in Alaska, Arkansas, and Austin, Texas because of
the absence of legislative records or findings).
230. Richardson, supra note 107, at 36.
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Although balancing clearer values is less than perfect, the test is a good
compromise of guidance and flexibility. As stated, the test clearly articulates
four values: democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual
autonomy, and electoral competition. The test requires that courts invalidate a
statutory provision in which the harms to these four values that arise from the
provision, on the whole, outweigh the provision’s benefits to these values.
The same criticisms that this Article applies to conventional overbreadth
tests could be leveled against balancing the four values. Preconceived notions
of different judges, for example, might lead them to emphasize particular
values or facts over others. Any judicial test, however, must be examined in
light of the alternatives. Inflexible rules such as an express advocacy test
might provide mechanical guidance. Such tests become obsolete quickly due
to the evolving nature of campaign practices and reforms. Judicial rules,
regardless of where they are set, also gloss over important democratic values.
At the other end of the spectrum, current overbreadth doctrines fail to
articulate values clearly or to address thorny empirical issues, forcing even the
best judges to make decisions, often subconsciously, based on their own
implicit assumptions and values. In the absence of a perfect solution, this
Article’s balancing test provides a good compromise of substantive democratic
values, sensitivity to context, and judicial guidance in this difficult area.231
Some might argue that political assumptions will influence judicial use of
the balancing test and that judges lack the capacity to articulate and apply
these four democratic values.232
While political assumptions may influence judicial use of the balancing
test, the concrete listing of the most important values allows judges to develop
231. It is interesting to note Professor Gerken’s perspective that:
One need not adhere to a highly philosophical, top-down approach to lawyering to
conclude that theory has a role to play in judicial decisionmaking. From a
pragmatic perspective, incompletely or minimally theorized agreements may
deprive courts of the opportunity to articulate mediating principles that can cabin
judicial discretion, render doctrine more coherent, and avoid the trap of inflexible
rules or mechanically applied proxies.
Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and
Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1466 (2002).
232. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 163 (forthcoming 2003) (asserting that the Court should
not provide a uniform definition of political equality); Bruce E. Cain, Commentary, Garrett’s
Temptation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1589, 1589–90, 1600–03 (1999) (criticizing ballot notations as a
slippery-slope to greater judicial intrusion into the electoral process); Daniel H. Lowenstein,
The Supreme Court Has No Theory of Politics—and Be Thankful for Small Favors, in THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245, 258–65 (David K. Ryden
ed., 2000) (criticizing theories that support aggressive judicial review in election law).
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at least a common starting point from which to analyze cases. In the absence
of explicitly articulated common values, judges rely on their own assumptions
about how democracy should work to apply the substantial overbreadth
doctrine. These assumptions often remain unstated and are therefore not
subject to challenge or debate, resulting in inconsistent decisionmaking.
Explicit normative engagement is likely once judges are required to explain
how their decisions advance specific values. An honest exchange about the
values that are to be balanced, rather than a glossing over of difficult issues
with abstract rhetoric and mechanical lines, will allow for the development of
a more coherent doctrine.
Some might doubt the competency of courts to balance normative values
and engage in political fact-finding. Section Two Voting Rights Act claims,
however, require that a court take account of polls, past election results, and
other political factors to make a decision based on a "totality of the
circumstances."233 In Section Five Voting Rights Act cases, courts determine
"retrogression" of minority voting strength by weighing factors such as
whether minority gains in a redistricting plan as a whole offset the loss in a
particular district and whether the plan adds or subtracts "influence
districts."234
The takings doctrine offers an analogy to the benefits of balancing values
in the campaign finance context. In 1922, the Court recognized that if a
regulation goes "too far" in infringing on property rights, it constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of property.235 It was not until 1978, however, that the
Court crafted a three-factor balancing test to improve judges’ ability to
determine whether a regulatory taking exists.236 Difficult cases still arose after
the adoption of the balancing test, but fewer of them existed because judges
and legislators had more guidance. As with regulatory takings, the balancing
233. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986).
234. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2511–12 (2003) (describing the rough
balance in majority-minority districting between boosting minority representation and isolating
minority voters from the rest of the state). Courts have also used context-specific,
circumstantial evidence to make politically tinged decisions about whether members of the
Communist party represented a "clear and present danger" to the United States. See Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508–11 (1951) (applying the "clear and present danger" test not
rigidly, but in light of the circumstances of the case); see also Richardson, supra note 107, at 10
(discussing the importance of the circumstances in which an utterance is made to the
determination that evil will probably ensue).
235. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
236. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978)
(establishing that the factors to balance in determining a regulatory taking include:
(1) character of governmental action; (2) economic impact; and (3) interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations).
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of clearer values in the campaign finance context reduces the extent to which
outcomes turn on judicial guesswork.
Difficult campaign finance cases will continue to surface. The most
difficult campaign reforms to review will combine both negative and positive
effects—the reform that infringes on individual autonomy and disadvantages
challenger candidates, for example, but enhances deliberation and widespread
participation. Nevertheless, a clearer articulation of values and evidentiary
standards will provide greater direction to judges and will result in fewer
difficult cases than under the current overbreadth doctrine.
D. Application of Balancing Clearly Defined Values to the
Electioneering Provisions
This Article now turns from abstract values to a detailed application of
the balancing test to the restriction on nonprofit electioneering spending and a
brief explanation of how the other provisions would fare. This Subpart
concludes by explaining the test’s comparative benefits over the conventional
overbreadth doctrine and an express advocacy rule.237
1. Applying the Balancing Test
The balancing test proposed above would likely tolerate the restriction on
electioneering spending by nonprofit organizations, but—unlike the majority
opinion in McConnell—only with regard to those funds that the nonprofit
receives from business corporations or labor unions. The electioneering
provisions prohibit nonprofit corporations that receive money from business
corporations or unions from spending their general treasury funds, as
distinguished from segregated PAC funds, on electioneering communications.
An "electioneering communication" consists of (1) any television, radio,
cable, or satellite broadcast, (2) that refers to a clearly identified candidate for
federal office, (3) run within sixty days before a general election or thirty days
before a primary election, (4) that can be received by at least 50,000 people in
the district the federal candidate seeks to represent.238 The court should
237. The analysis below relies on hypothetical evidence. As stated above, to prevent overreliance on political assumptions, courts should avoid the temptation to take judicial notice of
likely political incentives and effects. Instead, they should require that the parties develop a
factual record.
238. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
88–90 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434) (2002).
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invalidate the nonprofit restriction if the harms to competition, deliberation,
participation, and autonomy that arise from the restriction, on the whole,
outweigh the benefits to these values that result from the restriction. Due to
the diverse ideological agendas of nonprofits, the restriction on nonprofits
probably does not dampen competition by entrenching incumbents over
challengers. Studies showing that most nonprofit advertisements broadcast in
past elections depicted incumbents positively and challengers negatively
would strengthen this assumption.239
The nonprofit restrictions, however, do raise complicated issues regarding
deliberation, widespread participation, and individual autonomy that were
overlooked by the majority opinion in McConnell and inadequately articulated
by the Kennedy dissent. Nonprofit restrictions promote deliberation and
widespread participation because they prevent circumvention of the restriction
on corporate and union electioneering spending. The threat that a disgruntled
business corporation, for example, will use resources from its general treasury
to run attack ads in the final hours of a campaign interferes with legislative
deliberation. Further, such spending alienates potential voters who feel as
though their participation is less meaningful relative to the influence of
corporate treasuries. The restriction on nonprofit spending prevents a business
corporation or union from using resources from its general treasury to set up
and fund a nonprofit that will run attack ads in the final hours of a campaign.
Many nonprofits that accept limited funds from corporations and unions,
however, are not fronts for business corporations or unions. Individuals
organize nonprofits like the ACLU, the NRA, and the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to advance issues rather than
profits. Nonprofits engage in research, organizing, and advocacy, and are
likely to make unique and important contributions to citizen and legislative
deliberation.
Nonprofit spending also advances widespread participation and
individual autonomy. Whereas many shareholders of business corporations
view their shares as investments rather than associational mechanisms,240
239. The study would be especially effective if it showed that advertisements that
primarily promote tourism, pending legislation, state candidates, and ballot initiatives were
more likely to feature incumbents in a positive light.
240. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]orporate expenditures designed to further political causes lack the connection
with individual self-expression which is one of the principal justifications for the constitutional
protection of speech provided by the First Amendment. Ideas which are not a product of
individual choice are entitled to less First Amendment protection."). Randall P. Bezanson
notes:
The requirement that speech be traceable to the intention and beliefs of individuals
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nonprofits serve as important vehicles for individual citizens to participate in
an exchange about public issues. To the extent that people choose to make, for
example, modest fifty-dollar contributions to these nonprofits to combine their
resources to promote advertisements they could not otherwise afford, these
organizations facilitate meaningful, widespread participation and individual
autonomy.241 Unlike shareholders of a business corporation, individual
contributors to a nonprofit corporation generally expect their funds to be used
to engage in political expression that is consistent with the stated objectives of
the nonprofit corporation.242 Elected officials who respond to nonprofits are
responding to the desires of people who have assembled to further a particular
issue. Such a situation differs from government responsiveness to the raw
economic power of many business corporations that sell shares rather than
issues to amass capital.243
These values are not diminished simply because an organization accepts
donations from business corporations or unions. Distinguishing ideological
nonprofits that receive a few business contributions, such as the ACLU or the
NRA,244 from nonprofits organized and funded primarily by business
in order for the liberty of speaking to apply is an important factor in the
institutional speech calculus . . . . It serves to distinguish untraceable, and therefore
institutional, speech from individual speech that occurs in a collective or corporate
form.
Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 749 (1995); see also Adam P.
Hall, Note, Regulating Corporate "Speech" in Public Elections, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1313,
1320 (1989) (stating that First Amendment protection based on self-realization "does not seem
appropriate for artificial persons such as corporations, unless the corporation is utilized as an
associational mechanism through which its members can exercise their individual rights to selfexpression").
241. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YALE L.J. 1, 4, 22 (1964) (discussing the unique qualities of associations).
242. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260–61 (1986) ("Individuals
who contribute to [Massachusetts Citizens for Life] are fully aware of its political purposes, and
in fact contribute precisely because they support those purposes.").
243. A court, of course, should focus on evidence that supports and challenges these
general assertions. For example, some citizens may refrain from participating because they
believe nonprofits are "special interest groups" that control the democratic process. Nonprofits
do not always reflect their contributors’ views, and restraints on nonprofit spending might not
infringe on the autonomy of these contributors. For example, a contributor could clearly
support a cause yet oppose a candidate that the nonprofit supports because of the candidate’s
stand on other issues. Further, unlike corporate shareholders who enjoy voting power,
contributors often have little recourse when they disagree with the nonprofits’ electioneering.
Hall, supra note 240, at 1340–41.
244. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 698 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("With the imprimatur of this Court, it is now a felony in Michigan for the Sierra
Club, or the American Civil Liberties Union, or the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, to advise
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corporations, like Citizens for Better Medicare, presents a formidable
challenge. Although a nonprofit could sponsor electioneering communications
with funds from a segregated Political Action Committee (PAC), this option
might burden small, individual contributors who are required to donate to both
a PAC and a general expense fund. In balancing the relevant values, a court
might resolve the dilemma by limiting the application of the nonprofit
electioneering restrictions to nonprofit funds that originate from entities other
than natural persons.245 This would effectively require that nonprofits
segregate corporate and union contributions to ensure the funds are not used
for electioneering.
With regard to the other electioneering provisions, a court balancing the
four values might uphold the disclosure requirements and the restrictions on
corporate and union spending. Disclosure provides information that furthers
deliberation, but it does not interfere with individual autonomy to the extent
that the nonprofit spending restriction might. As mentioned above, corporate
spending poses special threats to legislative deliberation and generally does
not advance individual autonomy and widespread participation to the same
extent as nonprofit spending. Distinctions between unions and corporations
might cause a court to consider invalidating the union restriction.246 Electoral
competition concerns, however, might counsel against upholding corporate
restrictions while allowing overwhelmingly pro-Democratic unions to spend
on electioneering ads. Although the Court upheld restrictions on union
spending for the first time in McConnell, it provided no explanation for this
expansion of campaign finance doctrine. At the very least, clearer values
would prompt a court to explain the principles that undergird its decision to
uphold union spending restrictions.
2. A Comparative Analysis of Tests
Judicial balancing of specific values enhances both normative guidance
and sensitivity to context in judicial review of campaign reforms. A quick
application of conventional overbreadth and express advocacy tests to the
the public how a candidate voted on issues of urgent concern to its members.").
245. Note that evidence may show, now or at some future time, that spending by nonprofits
(or by individuals) causes grave harm to values like deliberation and participation, thus
warranting limitations on such spending.
246. Unions represent a large group of people rather than financial interests, and thus union
restrictions might pose a greater threat to widespread participation. Union spending presents
fewer individual autonomy problems because union members, unlike shareholders, can request
that the union not use their dues to support political causes. 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(a)(1) (2003).
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electioneering provisions might be helpful before comparing them to the
balancing of values. The conventional overbreadth doctrine would require a
court to compare the proportion of invalid applications of the electioneering
provisions to valid applications of the provisions. Due to the contested
meaning of "substantial" and nebulous evidentiary standards, some judges
might uphold the law while others might strike it down, as evidenced by the
Stevens/O’Connor majority opinion and the Kennedy dissent in McConnell. A
judge applying the express advocacy test would likely follow Justice Thomas’s
path and invalidate all four of the electioneering provisions for a different
reason: each provision regulates spending on advertisements that do not
contain express words of advocacy like "vote for" or "defeat."
Legal, technological, and social changes in politics abound, and the
proposed balancing test would allow courts to adhere to a stable set of values
while also responding to context-specific factors more effectively than other
tests. For example, the express advocacy test, focused solely on the content of
the regulated speech, would strike down the electioneering disclosure
provision even through it does not burden speech to the same degree as limits
on electioneering spending. A judge applying the conventional overbreadth
tests might do the same, referencing the possible invalidity of seventeen
percent of the disclosure provision applications. Different types of regulation,
however, advance the state’s interest and infringe on expression to varying
degrees. A disclosure provision with a seventeen percent invalid application
rate, for example, might be less troubling than a spending restriction in which
seventeen percent of the applications are invalid.
Balancing these values not only allows judges to respond to the
differences between the regulations but also supports the distinction with
principled analysis. The public dissemination of spending data that stems
from disclosure advances democratic deliberation. Further, disclosure does
not restrict spending on speech. Advertisements that attack legislation like
Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, will still be a part of public deliberation so long
as sponsors disclose spending on such ads. In contrast, nonprofit spending
restrictions can sometimes reduce deliberation.
For similar reasons, disclosure causes minimal harm to individual
autonomy. The threat to individual autonomy is reduced further because the
disclosure provisions only apply to those who spend more than $10,000 per
Disclosure will not likely represent an
year on electioneering.247
insurmountable regulatory burden for those who can afford to spend this much
247. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201, 116 Stat. 81,
90 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2002)).
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on speech. Although large spenders may prefer to influence public issues
anonymously, democratic deliberation outweighs the autonomy interest
advanced by anonymous spending.248
Further, numbers like seventeen percent seem credible and weighty, but
they mislead judges. Different applications of any single statute are often not
simply "invalid" or "valid," but advance the state’s interest and infringe upon
expressive values to varying degrees. Even if such categorization were useful,
seventeen percent is not the percentage of ads that pose no threat of corruption
or appearance of corruption. Instead, it is the percentage of ads that study
participants classified as primarily advancing an issue or a cause rather than a
candidacy. An ad designed primarily to advance an issue can corrupt the
process as well, especially if it casts a member of Congress in a positive or
negative light.249
In short, the balancing process allows a court to focus on how values are
manifested in particular contexts. Tests that focus on counting invalid
applications or words of express advocacy are cumbersome tools to apply in a
fluid political environment. Values are better than fixed words or activities in
defining the boundaries of legislative authority over campaign finance.
The balancing of clearly defined values also provides greater normative
guidance than conventional overbreadth doctrine, which relies on nebulous
terms like "substantial." Granted, people will disagree about whether
particular activities or regulations advance the values and about how to resolve
conflicts between the values, but most people can understand the normative
goal of invalidating regulations that do more harm than good. A "substantial"
amount of overbreadth, on the other hand, is unclear and contested. Is it five
percent? Is it thirty-five percent? The four values also provide more guidance
than abstract phrases like "prevention of corruption." They unpack such terms
and explain the democratic objectives inherent in promoting expressive
activity and in regulating political money.
These democratic values bring the Court’s campaign finance decisions
together into a coherent whole. They allow courts to respect more fully both
expressive values and legislative authority and give legislatures clearer
248. The threat to autonomy is minimal. Those who disclose will not likely face
intimidation, loss of employment, or physical violence when their identities are disclosed. Cf.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that an Alabama
court’s contempt order against the NAACP for refusing to disclose its membership lists
abridged the NAACP members’ right "to engage in lawful association in support of their
common beliefs").
249. This factor was overlooked by Judge Richard Leon. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
798.
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guidance for crafting reforms. Further, the values themselves are substantively
important—they represent what many believe are essential components of
democracy. Collectively, the values expose the unbalanced nature of tools like
the express advocacy test, which overemphasizes the promotion of individual
autonomy at the expense of the democratic deliberation and widespread
participation values.
VI. Conclusion
This Article uses the Court’s conflicting opinions in McConnell v. FEC to
illustrate problems with current doctrine, but its analysis has far-reaching
implications for the next generation of campaign finance reform and
jurisprudence. Evasion has emerged as a primary challenge to campaign
finance regulation and Congress and state and local legislatures have begun to
close loopholes. The primary questions that remain ask how far campaign
finance regulations can go to prevent circumvention before they cover an
unacceptable amount of speech, and how courts should make this judgment in
a principled manner.
The Court in McConnell failed to take the opportunity to develop tools to
identify the boundaries of campaign reform. This Article proposes that in
future cases the Court adopt a judicial test that determines whether a campaign
regulation, on balance, results in greater benefit than harm to four values:
democratic deliberation, widespread participation, individual autonomy, and
electoral competition. The Court should also craft clearer evidentiary
standards that allow judges to make more competent and consistent predictions
about the probable political effects of reform.
Even if the Court does not substitute or supplement conventional
overbreadth tools with a formal balancing test, legislators should consider the
four values when drafting reforms, and judges should use them in reviewing
reforms. Rather than engaging in covert assumptions about cloudy objectives,
legislators and judges should explicitly examine whether a reform advances
the values underlying the Court’s reasoning in its campaign finance cases.
Granted, an adoption of a formal balancing test might do this most efficiently.
The larger objective, however, is for political and judicial decision-makers to
recognize that campaign finance involves a balancing of specific democratic
values, and that greater understanding and coherence arises through explicit
discussion of those values.

